If People Would Be Outraged by their Rulings, Should Judges Care by Sunstein, Cass R.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2007
If People Would Be Outraged by their Rulings,
Should Judges Care
Cass R. Sunstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "If People Would Be Outraged by their Rulings, Should Judges Care," 60 Stanford Law Review 155 (2007).
IF PEOPLE WOULD BE OUTRAGED BY
THEIR RULINGS, SHOULD JUDGES CARE?
Cass R. Sunstein*
At first glance, judicial anticipation of public outrage and its effects seems
incompatible with judicial independence. Nonetheless, judges might be affected
by the prospect of outrage for both consequentialist and epistemic reasons. If a
judicial ruling would undermine the cause that it is meant to promote or impose
serious social harms, judges might have reason to hesitate on consequentialist
grounds. The prospect ofpublic outrage might also suggest that the court's ruling
would be incorrect on the merits; if most people disagree with the court's
decision, perhaps the court is wrong. Those who adopt a method of constitutional
interpretation on consequentialist grounds are more likely to want to consider
outrage than are those who adopt an interpretive method on nonconsequentialist
grounds (including some originalists). The epistemic argument for judicial
attention to public outrage is greatly weakened ifpeople suffer from a systematic
bias or if public outrage is a product of an informational, moral, or legal
cascade. There is also an argument for banning consideration of the effects of
public outrage on rule-consequentialist grounds: judges might be poorly suited to
make the relevant inquiries, and consideration of outrage might produce undue
timidity. But in rare (but important) cases, judges legitimately attend to outrage
and its effects as a way of ensuring against futile or perverse outcomes. An
understanding of the consequentialist and epistemic grounds for judicial attention
to public outrage also bears on the appropriate understanding of political
representation; it offers lessons for the decisions of other public officials,
including presidents, governors, and mayors, who might be inclined to make
decisions that will produce public outrage.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial rulings can, and sometimes do, provoke public outrage. If the
Supreme Court ruled that states must recognize same-sex marriages, national
politics would undoubtedly be affected, and a movement for a constitutional
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amendment would be all but inevitable. If the Court said that the Establishment
Clause forbids the use of the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance,
I
the Court would face a great deal of public outrage. If the Court struck down
measures designed to reduce the risk of terrorism, especially in a period in
which that risk is acutely felt, significant parts of the public would be outraged
as well. Many judges are drawn, on occasion, to interpretations of the
Constitution that would outrage large segments of the public. How, if at all,
should courts think about, or deal with, the prospect of outrage?
A detailed literature attempts to show that the Supreme Court's decisions
are generally in line with public opinion and that, in light of the Court's actual
practices, the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" 2 is far less difficult than it might
seem. 3 To this extent, a degree of "popular constitutionalism, 'A captured in a
measure of public control of constitutional meaning, seems to be alive and well.
The Court rarely embarks on courses of action that are wildly out of step with
the strongly held views of citizens as a whole. 5 But there can be no question
that the Court's decisions can provoke public outrage, and that the Court
sometimes works to reduce the likelihood and intensity of that outrage.
6
The most famous example is Naim v. Naim,7 in which the Court refused to
rule on the constitutionality of a ban on racial intermarriage, largely because it
feared that its ruling would provoke outrage, in a way that might diminish the
Court's own authority. 8 It is reasonable to speculate that the Court's refusal to
decide the constitutionality of the use of the words "under God," in the Pledge
of Allegiance, had similar motivations.9 The invocation of the "passive
1. The Court avoided this issue in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1 (2004).
2. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
3. For an early treatment, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (arguing that the Court's
decisions generally follow the public opinion of the majority). For a recent and broadly
compatible discussion, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). For instructive analysis
of the general problem, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 577 (1993); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2596 (2003). For a valuable collection, see PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., forthcoming 2008).
4. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
5. See Dahl, supra note 3.
6. Compare BICKEL, supra note 2, at 111-98 (supporting the use of justiciability
doctrines to assist the Court in exercising the "passive virtues"), with Gerald Gunther, The
Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues "-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (book review) (criticizing the use of justiciability
doctrines to avoid principled decision making).
7. 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
8. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 174.
9. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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virtues," including justiciability doctrines, is often understood as an effort to
ensure that the Court's timing is "prudent," in the sense of reducing the danger
that judicial decisions will produce public reactions that will compromise the
Court's goals. '
0
This Article addresses the normative question of whether judges should
attend to outrage, not the positive question of whether they do so. With respect
to anticipated public outrage, the positive issues have received sustained
attention, whereas the normative issues have been explored only episodically.
11
My principal goal is to investigate whether and why anticipated public outrage
should matter to judicial decisions. 12 At first glance, an affirmative answer
seems quite jarring; many people believe that courts should interpret the
Constitution without attention to the possible objections of the public.' 3 On a
conventional view, the central goal of constitutional law, or at least judicial
review, is to impose a check on public judgments, and sometimes to override
those judgments even if they are intensely held. It would be odd to say that the
Supreme Court should not protect free speech or should allow racial
discrimination if and because it anticipates that the public would be outraged by
protection of free speech or by bans on racial discrimination. The idea that the
Court should anticipate and consider the effects of public outrage seems
inconsistent with the role of an independent judiciary in the constitutional
system.
Questioning the conventional view, I shall suggest two reasons why public
outrage might matter-and in the process attempt to explain the Court's
occasional reluctance to trigger outrage, as embodied in the use of justiciability
doctrines, narrow rulings, and deference to elected officials. The first reason is
consequentialist; the second is epistemic. The consequentialist claim is that if a
ruling would turn out to have terrible effects, judges should take those effects
10. See BICKEL, supra note 2.
11. The most sustained treatment is given in BICKEL, id., with the emphasis on the
"passive virtues" as a response, in part, to the problem of public outrage. As we shall see,
however, Bickel did not provide firm underpinnings for the Court's consideration of public
disapproval of its decisions, and he was hence left vulnerable to the charge of opportunism.
See Gunther, supra note 6 (criticizing the use of "passive virtues" as unprincipled).
12. There is an obvious relationship between this topic and the general one of "popular
constitutionalism," which sees "We the People" as a kind of tribunal of last resort. See
KRAMER, supra note 4. 1 offer a few remarks on this relationship below. Some strands of
popular constitutionalism, of course, have a strong normative feature, see id. at 248 (arguing
that the Supreme Court is "our servant and not our master"), but the focus is not on outrage
and its effects.
13. This view can be found, in one or another form, in RONALD DwoRKIN, JUSTICE IN
ROBES (2006); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMEs: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004); and
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1180 (1989).
We might take this view as standard while acknowledging that many people believe that
doctrines of justiciability are properly used to limit the Court's intervention in deference to
public reaction. See BICKEL, supra note 2. To the extent that this belief is widely held, as it
seems to be, the argument here might be seen as an effort to explain how it is best defended.
[Vol. 60:155
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into account. This claim depends on an admittedly controversial assumption, to
the effect that in deciding how to rule, judges should pay attention to the
consequences of their decisions. It is tempting to reject that assumption and to
think that judges should rule as they see fit even if the heavens would fall. 14
But if the heavens really would fall, perhaps judges should not rule as they see
fit.
The epistemic reason involves humility. Judges cannot always know
whether they are right, even about the meaning of the Constitution, and intense
public convictions may provide relevant information about the correctness of
their conclusions. Whether public convictions are pertinent depends in part on
their foundations and in part on the prevailing method of constitutional
interpretation. If the prevailing method makes constitutional adjudication turn
on disputable judgments of fact or morality, the beliefs of the public may
indeed be relevant. It is important, however, to know whether these public
beliefs are a product of a systematic bias or of cascade effects. If so, there is
much less reason to consider them, because they lack epistemic credentials.
To assess the consequentialist and epistemic reasons for considering public
outrage, it is necessary to distinguish between invalidations and validations of
decisions of the elected branches. As we shall see, the two raise different
considerations. If courts invalidate a law, and the consequences of the
invalidation are bad, the public has no means of response (short of a
constitutional amendment). It follows that if courts wrongly invalidate a law,
the result is likely to stick. For these reasons, the strongest arguments for
considering outrage apply in the context of invalidations. By contrast, courts
have far less reason to consider outrage before validating democratic decisions;
if the public greatly objects to a law, it can respond by changing that law
through democratic means. Statutory interpretation generally belongs in the
same category as validations.
There is, however, a plausible rule-consequentialist argument for asking
judges not to consider public outrage even in the context of invalidations.
Judicial judgments about outrage may be unreliable, and consideration of
outrage may produce excessive judicial timidity. While plausible in the
abstract, this argument depends on contestable empirical assumptions and may
turn out to be wrong. If it is clear that a decision would outrage the public and
that such outrage would be both intense and very harmful, courts have reason to
hesitate before invalidating the decisions of the elected branches.
The Court's seemingly opportunistic use of justiciability doctrines, and
puzzlingly narrow and shallow rulings, are often best defended in this light. I
shall ultimately conclude that while the epistemic arguments for considering
14. I use this phrase as a placeholder for real disaster. I explore below some of the
complexities in deciding what sorts of bad consequences should be considered in
constitutional adjudication.
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the effects of outrage turn out to be fragile, the consequentialist arguments
justify judicial hesitation in some admittedly unusual (but important) domains.
A recurring issue is whether judges have enough information to be
confident about either their judgments on the merits or their assessments of the
existence and effects of outrage. It is helpful to begin by assuming that they
have such information and seeing how the analysis proceeds on that
(admittedly unrealistic) assumption. Once the assumption is relaxed, the
analysis must be changed. There is little reason for courts to attend to public
outrage if judges lack information about the likely effects of their rulings but
have a great deal of information about the proper interpretation of the
Constitution. Those who want courts to attend to public outrage are likely to
believe that judges are not at sea in assessing consequences-and more
fundamentally to accept the view, associated with James Bradley Thayer, that
judges do not have special or unique access to constitutional meaning. 5 For
those who accept Thayer's position, attention to public outrage, or to public
judgments more generally, might well be justified on epistemic grounds.
While my focus is on public outrage and its consequences, the discussion
will bear on several other questions, some of them quite large. Nearly every
public institution is barred from taking account of certain considerations that
plainly ought to matter from a consequentialist perspective. The ban on
consideration of certain factors often operates as a legal or moral taboo; but
why? The most plausible answer is that in some settings, the overall
consequences are much better if institutions refuse to take account of certain
consequences. A larger implication of this answer is that in both the private and
public spheres, "role morality"-the particular moral principles associated with
particular social roles-is most sensibly justified on rule-consequentialist
grounds. As we shall see, the argument for refusing to consider outrage and its
effects is best defended on those grounds.
If the analysis of the consequentialist and epistemic arguments has force, it
should also have general implications for those who favor "popular
constitutionalism"' 16 and for those who are skeptical about the institution of
judicial review on democratic grounds. 17 Some of the best arguments for
popular constitutionalism, and for challenges to judicial review, may well be
epistemic in character; perhaps the citizenry has a better understanding, under
some circumstances, of how the founding document should be construed. 18 But
I shall raise serious questions about both consequentialist and epistemic
arguments for considering outrage. By understanding the limitations of those
arguments, we shall be in a better position to assess the claims of those who
15. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893).
16. See KRAMER, supra note 4; JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (2004).
17. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006).
18. See MARK TUsHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
[Vol. 60:155
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favor popular constitutionalism and those who question judicial review in the
name of democracy.
A general lesson is that no conclusions about the proper response to
outrage and its effects, popular constitutionalism, or judicial review can be
established in the abstract, or through large-scale claims about the goals and
nature of self-government. A great deal depends on empirical assumptions and
on the real-world capacities of various institutions.
As we shall see, the epistemic argument for considering outrage is based
on the general idea that large groups of people are highly likely to be right, at
least if most group members are likely to be right. This idea helps to explain
recent enthusiasm for the "wisdom of crowds."'' l With respect to constitutional
interpretation, however, crowds may not be so wise, because they may suffer
from a systematic bias, or because their judgments may be a product of
informational cascades or group polarization, often induced by what we might
call meaning entrepreneurs. An understanding of the problems introduced by
systematic biases, and by cascade and polarization effects, bears both on
popular constitutionalism and the risk that large groups may be quite mistaken.
This Article comes in five parts. Part I discusses invalidations and
consequentialist arguments for considering public outrage. Part II explores the
possibility that when outrage is anticipated, judges should take it into account
for epistemic reasons. Part III turns to the case of validations, with brief
reference to the question of statutory interpretation. Part IV discusses
approaches to constitutional interpretation that seem to counsel against
considering outrage. Originalism is the main example here, but those who
emphasize "moral readings" of the Constitution might also be skeptical of the
idea that judges should consider outrage. Part IV also explores minority
outrage. Part V briefly discusses the relevance of the consequentialist and
epistemic arguments for others exercising public authority, including
presidents, legislators, governors, mayors, and jurors. A primary claim in Part
V is that when officials consider public outrage, they might be humble rather
than cowardly, acting as they do because they believe that their own judgments
are imperfectly reliable.
I. INVALIDATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
Let us begin with cases posing the question whether anticipated public
outrage should play a role in a judge's decision whether to vote to invalidate a
decision of the elected branches, whether state or federal, on constitutional
grounds. As we shall see, such cases present the strongest arguments for
considering outrage, because the public cannot easily correct judicial
19. For a popular presentation, see JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
(2004); for a more academic treatment, see SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE
POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2007).
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invalidations that produce bad consequences. Throughout I shall assume that a
strong majority of the public, rather than a minority, is outraged; I shall turn to
the case of minority outrage in due course.
20
A. The Problem
Suppose that a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Bentham, is
convinced after due deliberation of the following propositions:
A. The ban on same-sex marriages is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
lB. The ban on polygamous marriages is a violation of the Due Process
Clause.
IC. The use of the words "under God, " in the Pledge of Allegiance, is a
violation of the Establishment Clause.
1D. Capital punishment is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.
1E. The President may not commit troops to a military conflict without
either a formal declaration of war or an authorization to use force from
Congress.
IF. Racial segregation in a high-security prison is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Suppose that all six of these propositions are at issue in cases before the
Court (it is an exciting term). In all six cases, the Court is deadlocked 4-4;
Justice Bentham has the deciding vote. True to his name, Bentham supports
propositions 1A-IF with close reference to consequentialist considerations; he
has chosen his theory of constitutional interpretation on consequentialist
grounds, and he applies his theory in a way that takes account of
consequences. 2 Suppose finally that Bentham believes that if he votes as his
convictions suggest, there will be extremely serious public opposition, going
well beyond disagreement to outrage. In all six cases, he believes that the
Court's decision will become highly relevant to national politics, and that those
who side with the Court, and even those who do not vigorously oppose it, will
suffer badly.
In cases lA-1D, he believes that many officials will refuse to accept the
Court's decision, and the Constitution will be amended to overturn the Court's
decision. In case 1E, troops have already been committed, and Bentham thinks
that from the standpoint of national security and protection of lives of
20. See infra Part 1V.C. Of course it is also true that, in many cases, much of the public
will be unaware of the Court's decisions, or largely indifferent to them even if aware. The
focus here is on those unusual cases in which the public is both aware and intensely
interested.
21. These statements raise obvious complexities; I return to them below. To
understand Bentham's dilemma for purposes of the inquiry I am exploring here, it is not
necessary to know exactly why Bentham has decided in favor of propositions I A-IF.
[Vol. 60:155
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American soldiers, invalidation would be worse than unfortunate. In case IF,
Bentham believes that if he votes in accordance with his commitments, so as to
require immediate desegregation, officials will refuse to obey, and segregation
will continue. Let us stipulate that Bentham thinks that all of these
consequences would be very bad. How should Bentham vote?
To orient the discussion, let us begin with two simplifying assumptions
(eventually to be relaxed). First, Bentham has no doubt at all about the
correctness of his views in the six cases. He is certain, and he is certain that he
has excellent reason to be certain, that he is right about the proper interpretation
of the Constitution (putting outrage and its effects to one side). Second,
Bentham has no doubt about his predictions about the consequences of the
Court's decision. He happens to have an entirely accurate crystal ball, and he
knows what will happen if the Court does as he thinks best, as a matter of
principle. Bentham is aware that different consequences might play a different
role in his assessment about what to do. Perhaps a constitutional amendment,
overturning the Court's decision, is acceptable, whereas a significant increase
in the risk to national security is much less so. I will return to these questions
shortly; let us simply stipulate that Bentham has good reason to think that if he
votes as he sees fit, very bad consequences will follow.
For Bentham, the ultimate conclusion is straightforward. In cases that are
rare but important, he will attend to outrage and its effects. Unsurprisingly,
Bentham is a committed Benthamite; his own theory of interpretation is
consequentialist, and he is entirely willing to consider the consequences of his
rulings, including those consequences that stem from public outrage. He is
aware that some judges adopt theories of interpretation on nonconsequentialist
grounds, but he thinks that if the consequences of a judicial ruling would be
especially bad, all judges should be prepared to take them into account.
Bentham does take the possibility of rule-consequentalism very seriously.
He knows that if judges investigate consequences in particular cases, the
consequences might be very bad. He is aware that a clear, firm rule might
reduce the costs of decisions and the costs of error, as compared to a situation
in which judges make case-by-case assessments of the consequences. Bentham
is willing to listen to the proposition that on rule-consequentialist grounds, he
should not consider outrage and its effects, because such consideration might
lead to undue judicial timidity, encourage strategic behavior, or otherwise
distort the judicial process. In the end, however, Bentham rejects the rule-
consequentialist argument, concluding that in unusual cases, consideration of
outrage is appropriate and he will support use of the passive virtues, narrow
rulings, and deference to elected officials.
These are Bentham's conclusions. Let us see how he arrives at them.
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B. Kantian Adjudication
Some judges do not attend to outrage at all. Perhaps Bentham
(notwithstanding his name) will be willing to consider a practice of Kantian
adjudication: even if the heavens will fall, the Constitution must be interpreted
properly. Indeed, Kantian adjudication appears to be the informal working
theory of judges and lawyers, so much so as to make it plausibly outrageous for
judges to defer to outrage. Though actual judicial practices suggest a far more
complicated picture,22 the idea of Kantian adjudication seems to capture the
conventional view about how courts should approach public outrage and its
potentially harmful effects. Many and probably most judges and lawyers
believe that public outrage is neither here nor there, and that judges' solemn
duty is to interpret the Constitution as they see fit; one of my goals here is to
see on what grounds this conventional belief might be best defended.
According to those who endorse Kantian adjudication, the proper
interpretation of the Constitution has nothing to do with what the public
believes or wants. The role of the Court is to say what the law is (using the
appropriate interpretive method), and its conclusions on that point should be
unaffected by the public's will.23 Indeed, a sharp separation between law and
politics might be thought to depend, crucially, on a commitment to Kantian
adjudication. Compare the domain of statutory interpretation. Suppose that
Bentham believes that the Endangered Species Act of 197324 compels the
termination of a popular and nearly completed project, 25 or that Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 196426 permits affirmative action;27 suppose too that both
of these rulings will provoke public outrage. At least at first glance, it would
seem implausible to say that Bentham should alter his votes about statutory
meaning to avoid such outrage. (We will return to the question why this is
so.28) Bentham should consult the standard sources of statutory meaning, above
all the enacted text, and the risk or reality of outrage is immaterial.
In the context of potential invalidations, the argument for Kantian
adjudication might seem even more forceful. Why should judges uphold
unconstitutional measures-for example, racial discrimination or detention
without due process of law or restrictions on free speech-merely because the
public would be outraged if they struck down those measures? Deference to
22. See supra notes 2-11.
23. See Scalia, supra note 13, at 1180.
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
25. Cf TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (enjoining such a project under the
Endangered Species Act).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000).
27. Cf United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding
affirmative action plan).
28. See infra Part Il.
[Vol. 60:155
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public outrage seems hopelessly inconsistent with the role of judges in a
constitutional system.
But for two reasons, there is a serious question whether judges should be
unconditionally committed to Kantian adjudication. The first reason is that
even Kantians typically believe that moral rules can be subject to
consequentialist override if the consequences are sufficiently serious.2 9 If total
catastrophe really would ensue, judges should not rule as they believe that
principle requires. Suppose that the consequence of a ruling consistent with 1E
would be to endanger national security; perhaps judges should refuse to issue
that ruling. Consider in this regard Justice Jackson's suggestion that his
conclusion that courts should not enforce the military order to detain Japanese-
Americans on the West Coast need not be taken to "suggest that the courts
should have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task.",
30
Or suppose that the consequence of a ruling consistent with IA would be
merely to hasten a result that would have taken place without the Court's
invalidation, while also heightening political polarization, promoting the
electoral prospects of those who reject same-sex marriage, increasing hostility
to gays and lesbians, and eventually leading to a constitutional ban on same-sex
marriage. In this way, a ruling consistent with IA would prove self-defeating in
the particular sense that it would greatly decrease the likelihood that same-sex
marriages would ultimately be recognized. 3 1 Even a committed Kantian
adjudicator might well hesitate to rule in the way indicated by IA.
The second and more fundamental reason is that it is not clear that the
principle of Kantian adjudication makes much sense, at least if it is defended on
Kantian grounds. The core Kantian claim is that people should be treated as
ends, not as means. 32 One person should not lie to another, or trick another into
doing his bidding, because lies and tricks treat people as mere instruments, and
do not give them the respect that they deserve. Is Kantian adjudication
necessary to ensure that people are treated as ends rather than as means?
Perhaps the answer is affirmative. Suppose that Justice Bentham hesitates
to invalidate a law banning same-sex marriage, because he believes that the
public will react intensely, in a way that will produce overall harm. The
plaintiffs might ask: if Justice Bentham fails to invalidate the law, not on the
ground that he believes it to be constitutional, but to avoid other adverse
consequences, is he not treating us as means to other ends? Why should our
rights be sacrificed because their vindication would produce bad consequences?
Justice Bentham might respond that in taking account of the effects of his
29. For an overview, see Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 893, 898-901 (2000).
30. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
31. 1 note below some complexities in the question whether this consequence is
relevant, and whether this self-defeating sense is the right one.
32. For a good discussion, see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on
Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325 (1986).
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ruling, he is not treating anyone as a means. He is concerned with the
protection of rights, and he fears that rights, properly conceived, might
ultimately be undermined if he rules in the plaintiffs' favor. To assess that
concern, we would have to understand exactly what sorts of adverse
consequences he fears. I will take up that question shortly. For now, the simple
point is that whether Justice Bentham is violating Kantian strictures is likely to
depend on why he hesitates to protect the rights in question.
The most natural defense of Kantian adjudication lies in the thought that
the judiciary must remain faithful to the law; whatever judges might think of
Kant, their duty is to say what the law is (and hence to disregard public
disapproval, however intense). In the end, this conclusion may be right, but as
stated, it is a conclusion in search of an argument. I shall ultimately suggest that
Kantian adjudication is best understood as a kind of moral heuristic, 33 justified
on rule-consequentialist or systemic grounds. The claim must be that certain
people in certain roles ought not to consider certain consequences, because
consideration of such consequences would likely lead to bad consequences. If,
for example, the Supreme Court decided voting rights cases by asking whether
one or another decision would have good consequences by helping the best
political candidates, the social consequences would not likely be good. In short,
the intuitive judgment that certain consequences, or all consequences, are off-
limits to certain officials might itself have to be justified on consequentialist
grounds. But to say this is to get ahead of the story.
C. Interpretive Theories and Consequences
If Bentham is inclined to consider the effects of outrage, there is an
immediate puzzle: What is the theory of constitutional interpretation that gives
rise to Bentham's judgments in cases 1A-1F? Is it a consequentialist theory?
Does Bentham hold it because of its consequences? A consequentialist had
better give an affirmative answer. At first glance, any judgment about whether
judges should consider outrage and its effects turns on the underlying theory of
interpretation.
To come to terms with this point, we should distinguish between
Bentham's theory of interpretation and Bentham's theory of adjudication. We
could imagine a judge who has a consequentialist theory of both interpretation
and adjudication, that is, a judge whose views about constitutional
interpretation depend on the consequences and who is alert to consequences in
deciding how, exactly, to rule. Justice Stephen Breyer and Judge Richard A.
Posner appear to fall in this category.34 Their accounts of interpretation are
33. See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 531 (2005).
34. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIvE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2005) (invoking consequences to assess theory of interpretation); RICHARD
A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) (same).
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based on consequences, and they also think that judges should attend to
consequences in particular cases. 3 By contrast, we could imagine a judge who
has a nonconsequentialist theory of interpretation, believing (for example) that
originalism is the only plausible approach (and for nonconsequentialist
reasons), 36 but also agreeing that consequences matter when a judge is deciding
whether and how broadly to rule. An originalist might believe, for example,
that the meaning of the Constitution is settled by the original understanding,
while also believing that it is legitimate to rule narrowly in cases in which wide
rulings would have unfortunate effects.
We could imagine a judge who believes that consequences are irrelevant
both to interpretation and to adjudication. Such a judge might believe that
originalism provides the right theory of interpretation, or that interpretation
calls for moral readings, while also believing that judges should not consider
consequences in deciding how broadly to rule. We could even imagine a judge
who adopts a theory of interpretation on consequentialist grounds, but who
believes that consequences are irrelevant to judicial rulings, once the
appropriate method is applied.3 7 Perhaps this approach could be justified on
rule-consequentialist grounds, with the thought that case-by-case inquiries into
consequences, even in unusual cases, would increase the burdens of decisions
while increasing the number of errors.
It should be clear that Bentham is not an originalist; but why not? Suppose
that Bentham rejects originalism because in his view, it would produce
unacceptable consequences. 38 Suppose that Bentham also believes that the
Court should usually be reluctant to strike down acts of the elected branches,
because a presumption of validity will lead to good consequences. 39 Suppose
finally that the other ingredients of Bentham's own approach to interpretation
are somewhat eclectic. Perhaps he is inclined to require the executive to be able
to show clear legislative authorization for many actions involving national
security. 40 Perhaps he believes that the Court properly takes a somewhat
aggressive role in protecting traditionally disadvantaged groups and in
protecting the most intimate of choices.4 1 Suppose that Bentham is ultimately
prepared to justify his approach, however eclectic it may be, in terms of its
35. See BREYER, supra note 34; Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 90-102 (2005).
36. See Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left- Wing Law
Professors Are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207 (2006) (book review)
(arguing that a form of originalism is required by the very notion of interpretation).
37. See Gunther, supra note 6, for an account of why this view might be coherent.
38. See BREYER, supra note 34.
39. See VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 21-24.
40. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 1 (2004).
41. See JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF
AUTONOMY (2006).
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consequences. If so, consideration of public outrage seems at first glance
reasonable and perhaps even obligatory, at least if that outrage would lead to
bad consequences.
D. Passivity, Minimalism, and Deference
If Bentham is inclined to consider public outrage in cases lA-IF, he is
likely to ask: what are my options here? Perhaps Bentham can refuse to address
the merits at all, postponing them for another day. In case IC, for example,
Bentham might look for some ground, such as standing or ripeness, that would
allow him not to express a view on the underlying issues.
To see why, consider Alexander Bickel's influential discussion of the
"passive virtues. ' '42 Bickel insisted that the Court's role was not to uncover the
Constitution's original meaning but to identify and to announce certain
enduring values-to discern principles that would properly organize
constitutional life. Bickel believed that courts were in a unique position to carry
out that role. In his view, "courts have certain capacities for dealing with
matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess." 43 Bickel
was no originalist. He did not believe that judgments about those matters would
be static; he fully recognized the Court's creative role. 44 At the same time,
Bickel thought that a heterogeneous society could not possibly be governed by
an array of judicially announced principles. In his view, "[n]o good society can
be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden.
' 4 5
On some occasions, Bickel argued, the Court should give the political
processes relatively free play, by neither upholding nor invalidating its
decisions. The Court's task in judicial review is to maintain both "guiding
principle and expedient compromise"46 -and to do so by staying its hand in the
face of strong popular opposition, however indefensible the opposition might
be. Notably, Bickel did not specify the precise grounds on which the Court
should stay its hand. Was the ultimate concern the preservation of the Court's
own authority, the risk that judicial rulings would prove self-defeating, the
threat of rebellion and violence, or something else? In any event, a judgment
about the consequences of excessive intervention would undoubtedly motivate
its hesitation.
Perhaps Bentham is unable to exercise the passive virtues so as to avoid
addressing the merits. Even if so, Bentham might be able to address the merits
in a way that reduces the magnitude and effects of public outrage. He might
42. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 111-98. But see Gunther, supra note 6 (objecting that
the Court should be principled and that use of the passive virtues is too opportunistic).
43. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 25.
44. Id. at 24-26.
45. Id. at 64.
46. Id.
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ensure that the Court rules modestly or in a way that avoids theoretical
ambition to the extent possible. Bentham might aim for a degree of narrowness,
in the form of a decision that leaves many issues unresolved, or instead
shallowness, in the form of a decision that is agnostic on some of the deepest
questions. 47 In case IA, for example, Bentham might say: "States must provide
the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples; we need not decide whether (or
we do not decide that) states must make marriage itself available." In case 1 B,
Bentham might say: "States may not forbid religious institutions from
performing and respecting polygamous marriages; we need not decide whether
(or we do not decide that) states must perform and respect such marriages." In
either case, Bentham might attempt to avoid theoretically ambitious claims
about the nature of "liberty" under the Due Process Clause, or the ideal of
equality under the Equal Protection Clause. In short, a minimalist strategy,
reducing or eliminating public outrage, might be tempting.
Bentham is most unlikely to want to join the view of those justices with
whom he disagrees on the merits; he will not be inclined to commit himself to
an interpretation of the Constitution that he rejects as a matter of principle. Nor
will Bentham want to misstate the actual grounds for his conclusion. 4 ' But
suppose that he cannot invoke any basis for avoiding the constitutional
question, and that he is certain that if public outrage and its effects are
considered, the Court should greatly hesitate before ruling in favor of
propositions lA-IF. Perhaps he could write a concurring opinion that starts
with these two sentences: "I am not convinced that the prevailing view is
correct in its interpretation of the Constitution. But in view of the appropriately
modest role of the judiciary in a democratic society, I concur in the judgment."
To make this opinion plausible, Bentham would have to spell out, with
some particularity, exactly what is entailed by the second sentence. He might
gesture toward epistemic considerations, Pointing to the need to pay respectful
attention to the considered judgments of other branches 49 and his fellow
47. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
48. This point itself raises serious puzzles. If Bentham is a consequentialist, is it so
clear that he will refuse to lie about the grounds for his judgment, even if lying would
produce good consequences? One answer is that lies ultimately produce bad consequences;
the publicity condition, requiring officials to act in ways that can be defended honestly and
in public, might be understood as a way of ensuring against those bad consequences. See
David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154
(Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996). Another answer is that notwithstanding his name, Bentham
may believe that lying is an intrinsic wrong, because it does not treat his fellow citizens with
respect. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 334, 353-60 (1991). Note that Bentham is a consequentialist, not a
utilitarian; he may therefore believe that treating people disrespectfully is an independent
wrong, one that counts in the consequentialist calculus. See Amartya Sen, Fertility and
Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1035, 1038-39 (1996) (noting the possibility of considering
rights violations as part of the assessment of consequences).
49. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (198 1) (emphasizing the need to attend
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citizens. He might add an explicit reference to consequentialist considerations,
pointing to sharp social divisions and the potentially unfortunate effects of
judicial intervention into a sensitive area. 50 To see how an opinion of this kind
might be elaborated, we need to investigate some details.
E. Consequentialism
Suppose Bentham believes that acts must be evaluated by asking whether
they produce good consequences, all things considered. I have stipulated that
Bentham's theory of constitutional interpretation is itself based on
consequentialist considerations. 51 If Justice Bentham is a consequentialist, of
course, he will not be much interested in public outrage as such. The question is
whether that outrage will produce bad effects. If so, it would be especially odd
for him to refuse to consider public outrage to the extent that it bears on the
consequences of one or another ruling.
1. Futility, perversity, and overall harm
We might imagine three reasons that outrage might lead to bad
consequences. 52 First, it may render a judicial decision futile. Suppose, for
example, that in 1954, a ruling in favor of immediate desegregation would
simply be ignored. An argument in favor of the controversial "all deliberate
speed" formulation in Brown v. Board of Education53 was that it was necessary
to ensure that desegregation would actually occur and that the Court's ruling
would ultimately be obeyed. 54 Second, outrage might make a judicial decision
perverse, in the sense that it might produce consequences that are the opposite
to constitutional judgments of other branches).
50. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (fearing
that deeming a Ten Commandments display a violation of the Establishment Clause would
"encourage disputes concerning the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten
Commandments" and "create the very kind of... divisiveness that the Establishment Clause
seeks to avoid"); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15 (2004) (referring
to "a highly public debate over ... the propriety of a widespread national ritual, and the
meaning of our Constitution").
5 1. A straightforwardly consequentialist argument in favor of a distinctive approach to
interpretation can be found in BREYER, supra note 34.
52. I borrow here from ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION:
PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991).
53. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
54. For illuminating discussions of the controversy over the "all deliberate speed"
formulation, see KLARMAN, supra note 3; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY
(2d ed. 2004); and J. HARVIE WILKINSON Ill, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954 TO 1978 (1979). Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585 (1983), offers a valuable discussion of the role of public resistance, and
outrage, in the selection of remedies.
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of those intended by the Court. In the political domain, it is easy to think of
illustrations, such as when an environmental regulation imposed on new
polluting sources turns out to increase pollution by increasing the life and use
of old polluting sources. 55 In the legal domain, we can imagine how a decision
in 1962, requiring states to recognize racial intermarriage, might have fueled
resistance to racial desegregation and thus disserved the goal of ensuring
compliance with the Court's desegregation decisions and the Equal Protection
Clause in general.56 Third, outrage may render a judicial decision neither futile
nor perverse, but might produce overall harm, as when the Court vindicates a
constitutional principle in such a way as to endanger national security.5 7 Some
people insist that judges rightly interpret the Constitution with an eye toward
consequences, above all to ensure that national security is not threatened by
their rulings.
58
2. Judicial self-preservation
If Bentham is concerned about the risk of futility, he will immediately
focus on a distinctive consideration, involving the Court's own "capital." On
one view, judges should attend to public outrage because of the particular risks
to the judiciary itself. Lacking electoral legitimacy or a police force, judges are
highly dependent on public acceptance of their authority. If the public is
outraged, judicial authority might well be jeopardized. And indeed, most
discussion of the "passive virtues," and of the Court's caution in its will on the
public, has been focused on this consideration.
59
Perhaps a controversial ruling, involving the words "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance or same-sex marriage, would increase public attacks on
the Court, making the judiciary a salient target in elections and spurring
jurisdiction-stripping bills and other legislative efforts to reduce the Court's
55. See Howard Gruenspecht, Zero Emission Vehicles: A Dirty Little Secret, POLICY
MATTERS (AEI-Brookings Joint Center, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2000, available at
http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=51 (contending that the requirement of
low-polluting new vehicles will actually increase pollution in the short run, by extending the
life of older, high-polluting vehicles).
56. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (declining to decide whether bans on
racial intermarriage are unconstitutional). There are of course difficult issues about how to
characterize the underlying goals, such that a particular decision would turn out to be
perverse.
57. This is the fear expressed in Justice Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting), and probably in the Court's
opinion as well, see id. at 220 (majority opinion) ("[W]hen under conditions of modern
warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.").
58. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) (arguing for a pragmatic approach to the Constitution in the
context of national security, in a way that allows the executive wide room to maneuver).
59. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 2.
HeinOnline  -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 171 2007-2008
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
authority and independence. If the Court is concerned about its own place in the
constitutional order, and wants to maintain its legitimacy and power, it might
take account of outrage as a method of self-preservation.
It is reasonable to think that judicial self-preservation is only a small part
of the picture, because the Court's own authority has proved remarkably robust
over time, and because harmful effects on the Court's legitimacy are only a
subset of the consequences that count. The Court might well be unduly
sensitive to the risk to its own authority, in a way that will distort its rulings on
the merits. But there can be little doubt that this risk has, on occasion, led to a
degree of judicial hesitation. If a judicial ruling would compromise the Court's
own role in the constitutional structure, it may well make sense to exercise the
passive virtues or to proceed in minimalist fashion.
3. Assessing consequences
Bentham will be interested in the full set of adverse consequences, not
simply the effects of outrage on the Court itself. If very bad things will happen
as a result of a ruling consistent with lA-iF, Bentham will be inclined to
exercise the passive virtues, to proceed in minimalist fashion, and perhaps even
to defer to the political process on the merits. But if Bentham attempts to
investigate exactly what he should do, he will encounter an immediate problem:
By itself, the idea of consequentialism is insufficiently informative. It does not
tell him how to weigh the potential consequences or even to know whether
certain outcomes count as good or bad.6 °
Unfortunately, Bentham's analysis of how to assess consequences cannot
avoid a degree of complexity. There are two central conclusions. First,
Bentham needs to make a range of supplemental judgments to get his
consequentialism off the ground. Second, Bentham might well decide, for rule-
consequentialist reasons, that some of his own personal convictions do not
matter at all. Because of its relative complexity, Bentham's analysis might
seem unfamiliar, but I believe that it tracks some of the informal analysis
undertaken, in hard cases, by both lawyers and judges.
Suppose, as seems plausible, that Roe v. Wade61 led to a great deal of
political polarization, which would not have occurred if the Court had refused
to recognize a right to choose abortion or if the Court had proceeded more
cautiously. 62 If so, did Roe therefore have bad consequences on balance? That
question cannot be answered without assigning weights to its various effects,
including immediate legalization of most abortions in the United States. It is
also possible that Bentham will conclude that for good consequentialist
60. See DWORKIN, supra note 13.
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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reasons, some consequences should not be considered at all. As I have
suggested, Bentham might ultimately adopt a form of second-order or rule-
consequentialism, through which he disregards certain effects of his decisions
and even some of his own political convictions.
To see the difficulties here, suppose that in a case involving same-sex
marriage, Bentham has three options: (1) vote in accordance with 1A, (2) refuse
to rule on the merits, or (3) vote to uphold bans on same-sex marriage. Perhaps
Bentham thinks that if he takes the first course, same-sex marriage will be
outlawed by constitutional amendment, raising risks of both futility and
perversity. Perhaps Bentham knows that if he refuses to rule on the merits,
same-sex marriage will be widely permitted in the United States, and sooner
rather than later. Perhaps Bentham believes that if he votes to allow bans on
same-sex marriage, legislation permitting same-sex marriages will actually be
passed relatively quickly; the Court's unfortunate ruling (as Bentham sees it,
given his constitutional convictions) will actually promote the achievement of a
situation that (in Bentham's view) the Constitution now requires.
How should Bentham assess this possibility? Perhaps Bentham believes
that as a matter of principle, same-sex marriages ought to be recognized in a
free society. But perhaps Bentham does not much care about his conviction on
this point. What matters, to him, is only his belief that the existing Constitution
is best interpreted to require states to recognize such marriages.63 Because he is
concerned with the best interpretation of the existing Constitution, Bentham
might agree that it is also perfectly legitimate, and entirely appropriate, for a
constitutional amendment to disallow same-sex marriages. Whether the
prospect of such an amendment counts as a bad consequence cannot be
resolved unless Bentham makes supplemental judgments of various sorts.
Bentham might believe, for example, that an amendment is not a relevant
consequence, because his own personal views about same-sex marriage are
immaterial; his legal judgments matter, not his personal views. If this is his
belief, then there is no risk of either perversity or futility. To be sure, Bentham
might be willing to consider public outrage in deciding on the appropriate
remedy for a constitutional violation, if outrage is relevant to the effectiveness
of any such remedy; hence outrage is highly relevant to judicial selection of
remedies. But if outrage will culminate in an amendment, perhaps Bentham
need not and should not pay attention. If this is so, it is because the ultimate
fate of same-sex marriage is none of his concern. This is a plausible view, but it
might ultimately require some kind of consequentialist defense-as, for
example, in the view that judges will do best if they do not take account of the
risk that their decisions will be rejected through amendment.
Bentham must make a range of additional judgments about what other
consequences should count. Even if Bentham's preferred ruling on IA does not
63. Admittedly, this belief will be based partly on the consequences of failing or not
failing to allow same-sex marriages.
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produce an amendment, perhaps that ruling will mobilize opponents of the
rights or interests in question and demobilize those who endorse those rights or
interests, in a way that will disserve some of Bentham's deepest convictions.
64
Perhaps the ruling will alter the nation's political dynamics, promoting the
interests of one party and undermining the interests of another. Perhaps the
ruling will have no such effects, but perhaps it will sharply increase political
polarization, leading to a great deal of hostility between those who approve and
those who disapprove of the Court's decision.65 Bentham must decide whether
these consequences matter and, if so, how much weight to assign to them.
Or suppose more particularly that Bentham's crystal ball tells him that if he
vindicates proposition IA, same-sex marriages will occur, and be respected, in
all states; that the nation will have an intense and hostile debate about the
question; that the Republican Party will greatly benefit from the debate; and
that a proposed constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriages will
ultimately fail. How is Bentham to assess these consequences? Perhaps he does
not consider these consequences especially bad. Perhaps he does not much like
consequences of this kind, but perhaps his commitment to the underlying
principle is sufficiently strong that he is prepared to vindicate it so long as
same-sex marriages will occur and be respected and so long as the proposed
amendment will fail. Perhaps the increase in polarization, and the political
consequences, are not sufficient to outweigh the desirable consequences that
would follow from the ruling he favors. The simple point is that even if outrage
leads to unintended or harmful consequences, Bentham cannot know that he
should avoid outrage, because the good consequences might nonetheless
outweigh the bad ones.
Or suppose Bentham's crystal ball shows that if he vindicates proposition
ID, capital punishment will cease in the United States for a long time; that the
nation will have an intense and hostile debate about the question; that the
Republican Party will greatly benefit from that debate; that a proposed
constitutional amendment to allow the death penalty will ultimately fail; and
that the Court itself will be subject to extremely harsh attacks for at least a
decade. How should these consequences be assessed? Perhaps Bentham's
commitment to the abolition of capital punishment, on grounds of
constitutional principle, is very strong, and perhaps nothing in this catalogue of
consequences outweighs that commitment. Why should human beings be
executed, in violation of constitutional commands, merely because the nation
will be more polarized, some politicians will win and others will lose, and the
Court itself will come under assault?
64. See ROSENBERG, supra note 62. Recall that Bentham is a consequentialist; his
deepest convictions are a product of his judgments about the effects of various outcomes.
65. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)
(arguing Roe v. Wade produced polarization that reduced possibility of compromise
solutions).
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As I have suggested, Bentham might believe that certain consequences-
such as the prospect of a constitutional amendment or the favorable effects for
one or another party-ought not to be counted at all. Bentham himself is likely
to think that this conclusion must itself be explained on consequentialist
grounds. If one party would produce better consequences than another party, is
it so clear that consequentialist judges should ignore that fact? (What if a
particular outcome would ensure the defeat of the Nazi Party?) Under ordinary
circumstances, consequentialists should be prepared to accept a second-order
constraint on judicial consideration of political effects, on the ground that the
overall consequences would be bad ifjudges asked whether their rulings would
favor one or another political party.6 6 Perhaps the same conclusion ought to
hold for consideration of whether a constitutional amendment would ensue, on
the ground that the overall consequences would be better if judges did not
consider that question.
Bentham is likely to conclude that for good rule-consequentialist reasons,
he should restrict the set of consequences to which he attends in deciding how
to vote. The more general point is that the consequentialist needs an account of
value to know whether the various consequences are good or bad, and to assess
the magnitudes of the various effects. The difficulty and contentiousness of the
assessment might well lead courts to adopt a general presumption or even a
firm rule against considering the effects of public outrage. But notwithstanding
this point, it seems clear that in some cases, of which 1A-1F are plausible
examples, bad consequences are inevitable, and consideration of those
consequences will tip the balance against deciding the case in accordance with
the principles to which Bentham otherwise subscribes.
Thus far, then, use of the passive virtues, or of minimalism, will sometimes
be the right response to the prospect of public outrage. And in some cases,
Bentham might even be willing to defer to the political process so as to avoid
especially bad consequences.
4. Judicialfallibility in assessing consequences: of rule-consequentialism
and system design
If Bentham sits on the Supreme Court, however, he might well be nervous
about certain forms of consequentialism. Let us relax a central assumption and
assume that Bentham has no crystal ball. He likes to think that he is not at sea
in deciding whether the public will be outraged, and he has a degree of
confidence in his judgments about the likely consequence of that outrage in
66. Compare the debate over Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). No one contended that
a member of the Court could legitimately take account of whether George W. Bush or Al
Gore would be a better president. It is interesting that pragmatic judges, insistent on taking
account of consequences, implicitly ruled that consideration entirely out of bounds. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE COURTS (200 1). The puzzle for the committed consequentialist is: why?
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particular cases. But Bentham knows that he may be wrong. He is entirely alert
to human fallibility, including his own, and he is aware that even if his own
judgments are fairly good, others are not so lucky.
There are three independent problems here. The first is a simple lack of
information. A projection of the existence of outrage may be a shot in the dark.
A projection of the effects of outrage may be more speculative still, not least
because judges may rely on information sources that are themselves
unrepresentative and therefore biased. The second problem is motivational.
Desires often influence judgments, 6 7 and judges who favor certain results, or
who are generally self-protective, may make erroneous judgments about the
likelihood and effects of outrage. The third problem involves strategic or
opportunistic behavior. If judges are willing to consider public reactions, and
are known to be so willing, people will have an incentive to exaggerate their
outrage and their likely response, producing a kind of "heckler's veto" against
judicial efforts to interpret the Constitution. Those who have a stake in the
outcome, including political entrepreneurs, might well signal, to the Court and
to the public, that they will do all they can to resist the Court's decision.
Suppose that in light of the absence of crystal balls, Bentham thinks that
consideration of the risk of public outrage will seriously complicate judicial
judgments, without at the same time improving them from the consequentialist
standpoint. 68 Bentham would be inclined to consider the following view: Even
if accurate judgments about the effects of public outrage would be, at least in
extreme cases, a legitimate part of judicial thinking, the risk of error means that
courts should not consider public outrage at all. Consideration of outrage makes
judicial decisions more difficult and unruly. And in the end, consideration of
outrage might make decisions worse, not better, on consequentialist grounds.
Suppose that judges will exaggerate outrage or see it when it does not even
exist. Suppose that judges will exaggerate the effects of outrage even when it
does exist. Perhaps the natural human tendency toward self-protection will
make judges risk-averse with respect to outrage. Perhaps they will give undue
weight to the possibility that the Court will be sharply criticized in public (not
itself an especially bad consequence) or face some kind of political reprisal.
Suppose too that because public attacks on the judiciary will be especially
salient to judges in particular, consideration of outrage would produce undue
timidity, in a way that will make judges less likely to do what they ought to
do.6 9 Perhaps the role of an independent judiciary would be seriously
undermined by consideration of outrage. On rule-consequentialist grounds,
67. An illustration is "confirmation bias," by which people's judgments about what is
true are influenced by their desire to have their own beliefs confirmed. See, e.g., Barbara
O'Brien & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations (Sept. 19,
2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=913357.
68. See Gunther, supra note 6, at 5.
69. See Scalia, supra note 13 (defending firm rules on the ground that they stiffen the
judicial spine when the stakes are high).
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Bentham would be willing to consider a prohibition on such consideration.
History suggests that Bentham might well be right to do exactly that; in the
domain of free speech, judges have tended to overestimate the adverse
consequences of allowing the airing of dissenting views, especially in
wartime.70 If judges consider outrage and its effects, they might be inclined to
exaggerate the problem, thus adding to the excessive caution that judges might
already feel when the stakes, and the heat, are high.7 '
There is another possibility. Bentham might ultimately reject the rule-
consequentialist argument on the ground that he is only one person and hence
powerless to ban consideration of outrage on his own. Even if this is so, a
social planner, engaged in system-wide design, might support that ban. Such a
planner might attempt to inculcate a strong norm, or even a taboo, against
judicial consideration of outrage. Consider the question whether judges should
ask whether one or another political party would be benefited by a judicial
decision. In most imaginable circumstances, a social planner would not want
judges to ask that question; consideration of the political consequences would
make the legal system much worse. Perhaps a similar argument justifies a
general ban on consideration of public outrage, especially if judges cannot
reliably assess the question of consequences. If they cannot do so,
consideration of outrage may increase the burdens of decisions while also
leading, on balance, to worse results.
The rule-consequentialist argument certainly cannot be ruled out of bounds
a priori. In some imaginable worlds, it would be convincing. But in our world,
it is not at all clear that this argument can be made convincing, at least not in
the abstract. Even if judges have fallible tools for considering public outrage,
they are not wholly at sea. If the Court invalidated the use of the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, public outrage would be entirely predictable;
so too if the Court required states to recognize same-sex marriage; so too if the
Court dramatically restricted Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause.
At least in cases in which outrage and its consequences are easily foreseen, it is
hard to rule its consideration off-limits on rule-consequentialist or systemic
grounds. Cases IA through IF are plausible examples.
The conclusion is that for consequentialist reasons, widespread public
outrage is a legitimate consideration where it would clearly produce serious
harm. 72 In rare but important cases, it is appropriate for judges to decline to
70. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); STONE,
supra note 13.
71. Cf Scalia, supra note 13, at 1180 (emphasizing the value of rules in allowing
judges to stand firm when popular pressure is intense).
72. As I have noted, a judge needs to make supplemental judgments to decide what
counts as such; recall here Justice Jackson's suggestion that his conclusion that courts ought
not to enforce the military order to detain Japanese-Americans on the West Coast need not
be taken to "suggest that the courts should have attempted to interfere with the Army in
carrying out its task." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
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resolve certain issues, or to rule narrowly and shallowly, if steps of this kind
would make such harm less likely to occur. If this conclusion is not especially
surprising in light of actual practice, all the better. We are now in a position to
understand the grounds for that practice, and also the grounds on which it might
be criticized.
5. Kantian adjudication revisited and some speculations about institutional
morality
Let us return in this light to Kantian adjudication, captured in the view that
judges should pay no attention to the risks of futility, perversity, or overall
harm. Compare those who exercise the social role of doctors. In deciding what
treatments to prescribe, doctors do not and should not ask whether extending
the life of a particular patient will produce good consequences. Doctors are not
permitted to prescribe ineffective treatments or to hasten death on the ground
that the world would be better if certain patients died. Nor is it appropriate for
lawyers, representing especially bad people, to collude with the prosecution to
ensure a conviction and a stiff sentence. Defense lawyers are obliged to provide
the best possible defense, and are not supposed to assess, in particular cases,
whether the consequences might be better if their clients were convicted.73
Perhaps judges are analogous. Perhaps their social role requires them to
rule consideration of certain consequences off-limits. Perhaps judges should
think in the following way: My job is to rule as the law requires. In the most
extreme cases, I might consider resigning from the bench, or I might consider
engaging in a form of civil disobedience. But while exercising judicial power,
my sole responsibility is to the law.
As we shall see, a central problem with this view is epistemic: judges
might be unsure what the law requires, and public outrage might be relevant to
that question. But the deeper problem is that a consequentialist justification is
required for most judgments about what is appropriately considered by either
private or public actors. Institutional morality, and role morality more
generally, must be defended in terms of its effects. The reason that lawyers
should not ask themselves about the consequences of helping a particular client
is that the legal system, taken as a whole, is far better if lawyers do not so
inquire.
To be sure, the question is not identical for doctors. Human beings should
be treated as ends rather than means, and there is a legitimate Kantian objection
to a medical decision to hasten a patient's death on consequentialist grounds.74
dissenting).
73. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1, 6 (1975) (noting that once a lawyer-client relationship with a criminal defendant is
established it is "appropriate and obligatory" for the attorney to put on a vigorous defense
even if the attorney believes the client to be guilty).
74. Cf Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence,
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But some consequentialists, as such, can agree that people should be treated as
ends; treating people as means is a part of the set of (bad) consequences that
count. 75 In any event, judges are more relevantly analogous to lawyers than to
doctors. If their decisions really would be futile or perverse, or produce overall
harm, they might well take those possibilities into account-unless rule-
consequentialist arguments convincingly suggest otherwise. Kantian
adjudication, and the distinction between following the law and civil
disobedience, are best understood as products of an intuitive form of rule-
consequentialism.
There is a broader point here about the moral obligations of those who find
themselves in certain social roles. Nearly every public institution is barred from
taking account of certain considerations that ought to matter from a
consequentialist perspective. Jurors are not supposed to ask whether a
particular verdict would contribute to an increase in Gross National Product or
find a favorable reception among most of their fellow citizens. Panels for the
National Academy of Sciences are asked to say what is true, whatever the
consequences, and it would be outrageous to ask such a panel to distort
scientific findings in order to avoid public outrage (or to obtain public favor).
Members of public institutions-including juries, National Academy of
Sciences panels, and regulatory agencies-are not supposed to ask whether one
or another conclusion would help their preferred political party, even if
members of such institutions believe that the consequences would be much
better if their preferred party were helped.
The ban on consideration of certain factors often operates as a moral taboo;
but why? In most settings, the overall consequences are much better if
institutions refuse to take account of certain consequences. A virtue of
assessing institutional morality in this way is that it permits us to explore
whether, in fact, any particular taboo can be justified in consequentialist
terms.
76
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REv. 751 (2005) (objecting on
deontological grounds to convictions of innocent people, even if consequentialism calls for
such convictions).
75. See Sen, supra note 48, at 1038-39 (arguing for a form of consequentialism that
sees rights violations as relevant consequences).
76. Compare Bernard Williams's well-known suggestion that in certain domains those
who make consequentialist assessments have "one thought too many." If someone makes
such an assessment before deciding to save his wife rather than a stranger from a burning
building, we might well conclude that he is having an excessive thought. See Bernard
Williams, Persons, Character, and Morality, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS,
1973-1980, at 18 (1981). So too, it might be thought, for those in certain institutional roles. If
a doctor asks whether a patient is benefiting society before undertaking a diagnosis, or if a
judge thinks about the consequences for the unemployment rate of a certain ruling, excessive
thinking is taking place. It is worth considering the possibility that Williams's claim is
correct, but only for reasons of system design: the consequences are best if spouses do not
think that way, and so too for doctors and judges. For a critique of Williams's position, see
Elinor Mason, Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many?, 2 ETHICAL THEORY &
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6. Judicial hedometers and consequentialism writ (very) large
Outrage is an extreme reaction to a judicial ruling, and it is distinctly
associated with a risk of bad consequences. But it is easy to imagine other
reactions. Perhaps people would not be outraged; perhaps they would be
disgusted, dismayed, frustrated, or disappointed. Alternatively, they might have
a range of positive reactions to a ruling. They might be happy, gratified,
relieved, thrilled, or exhilarated. Perhaps those positive reactions will produce
an array of valuable consequences. 77 If the Court invalidated certain restrictions
on the rights of property owners, surely many property owners would be
78pleased, and their positive reactions might have desirable economic effects.
(Perhaps the consequences would be good for economic growth.) When the
Court struck down the ban on same-sex relations, 79 many people were
undoubtedly elated.
Suppose that all judges had in their chambers a well-functioning
"hedometer"-a device that could produce accurate measures of people's
affective reactions to judicial decisions. Should judges consider the hedonic
consequences of their rulings, either in themselves or because of their eventual
effects? Or suppose that judges could consult contingent valuation studies, in
which people stated their willingness to pay for certain judicial decisions.
80
People are willing to pay significant amounts to ensure the existence of pristine
areas and animals; "existence value" is an established part of the practice of
contingent valuation. 8 1 Surely people would also be willing to pay significant
amounts to ensure the existence of certain legal outcomes; these too have an
MORAL PRAC. 243 (1999).
77. Cf BREYER, supra note 34 (defending validation of affirmative action on the
ground that it would promote inclusion and active democracy). Justice Breyer's point is not
that the reaction to the Court's decision would itself be a good consequence, or produce good
consequences, but he certainly offers a consequentialist defense of the Court's validation of
affirmative action.
78. Compare the public reaction to Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
President Bush, for example, reacted to the decision with an executive order instructing the
federal government to use eminent domain "for the purpose of benefiting the general public
and not merely for the purpose of advancing the economic interest of private parties to be
given ownership or use of the property taken." Exec. Order No. 13,406, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,973
(June 23, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/200 6062 3 -
10.html. For a valuable treatment of the controversy, see Janice Nadler et al., Government
Takings of Private Property: Kelo and the Perfect Storm (Northwestern Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 07-05, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstracts=962170.
79. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
80. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
335-36 (6th ed. 2006).
81. See VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD IN THE US, EU, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Ian J.
Bateman & Kenneth G. Willis eds., 1999).
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existence value. Ought judges to pay attention to any relevant evidence? Such
questions are admittedly fanciful, but it is important to figure out why.
For the committed consequentialist, it is tempting to answer that judges
should consider all relevant consequences, not merely those associated with
outrage. Negative feelings are themselves a social loss,82 and positive feelings
are a social gain. And if negative feelings would result in adverse effects, or if
positive feelings would produce desirable effects, they should certainly count.
A political leader, deciding whether to support a proposed bill, might well be
influenced by negative reactions of this kind, not only because her reelection
prospects might be affected, but also because she is a considered
consequentialist. If judges have hedometers and crystal balls, and are therefore
able to make perfect forecasts, the consequentialist judgment would seem to be
that they should reach the same conclusion, considering not merely outrage, but
the full array of effects of their decisions.
But for rule-consequentialist reasons, and from the standpoint of system
design for real-world judges, that conclusion would be hard to defend. It is an
understatement to say that judges lack reliable methods for measuring the
hedonic effects of their rulings. Any attempt to try would undoubtedly be
subject to distortions, including those distortions that come from the judges'
own beliefs and commitments. There are also questions about whether all
hedonic effects should count in the social welfare calculus, independently of
whether they should count in the judicial calculus: if people would be pleased
at the continuation of torture or discrimination, does their pleasure count? 83 If
judges attempted the relevant measurement and made its outcome relevant in
hard cases, the consequences would probably be worse, not better. If judges
should care at all about public reactions, the argument for doing so is strongest
in the case of outrage, because outrage is likely to produce the most damaging
consequences. The effects associated with other hedonic states are exceedingly
difficult to predict.
F. Bentham's Conclusion
With respect to public outrage and its effects, Bentham is left with two
possible conclusions. Perhaps Kantian adjudication is ultimately right, because
blindness to consequences is likely to produce the best consequences. This
conclusion might be defended on several grounds. First, courts lack reliable
tools for deciding whether outrage and adverse effects would be present; they
might well produce false negatives and false positives. Second, consideration of
82. See Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of
Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 987-89 (2004) (describing how a particular
negative feeling-fear-is a welfare setback and should be counted as a cost in cost-benefit
analyses).
83. For a discussion with relevant citations, see Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
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outrage would undoubtedly lead to strategic behavior, making public outrage
partly endogenous to the Court's willingness to take it into account. If people
are aware that their outrage will affect the Court, then they will have every
reason to produce outrage, creating a heckler's veto. Third, consideration of
outrage might produce undue timidity, especially in areas in which the Court's
role is most important. If widespread outrage is understood to be a legitimate
reason for the Court to fail to act, then the Court will uphold government
decisions that, by hypothesis, violate the Constitution, simply because people
are outraged at what the Constitution commands. If the document is taken as a
kind of precommitment strategy 84 designed to check certain actions-however
intensely those actions are supported at any moment in time-then
consideration of outrage will produce bad consequences, once those
consequences are properly understood and weighted.
But another conclusion is possible, and to Justice Bentham it will seem
more reasonable still: in unusual (but important) cases, judges are likely to have
sufficient information to know whether outrage will exist and have significant
effects, and in such cases they rightly hesitate before imposing their view on
the nation. This was Bickel's position about certain controversial rulings in his
era, 85 and it helps to explain the view that the Court was right not to invalidate
the ban on racial intermarriage in the 1950s 86 and wrong to rule so broadly on
the abortion question in the early 1970s.
8 7
It is easy to imagine analogues today, including invalidation of bans on
same-sex marriage, a large-scale expansion of the takings clause, 8 8 a
constitutional attack on references to God in currency and in the Pledge of
Allegiance, and sharp limitations on congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause (as, for example, through invalidation of popular civil rights
and environmental legislation). In at least some of these cases, consequentialist
considerations do seem to justify a degree of judicial hesitation. To the extent
that judges proceed cautiously in cases of this kind, we are now in a good
position to see why.
84. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (1995).
85. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 174-75.
86. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
87. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375
(1985).
88. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (calling for such an expansion).
[Vol. 60:155
HeinOnline  -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 182 2007-2008
October 2007] SHOULD JUDGES CARE ABOUT OUTRAGE?
II. HUMILITY, INVALIDATIONS, AND THE CONDORCET JURY THEOREM
Now let us relax a key assumption, involving not crystal balls but the
judge's level of confidence. Let us imagine, in short, that we are dealing not
with Justice Bentham but with Justice Condorcet.
Suppose that Condorcet accepts propositions 1A-IF, but he is not entirely
certain that he is correct to do so. Suppose that Condorcet, like Bentham, is
casting the tie vote on an evenly divided Supreme Court. Let us stipulate that in
these cases, Condorcet is aware that most officials and most citizens disagree
with him about the appropriate understanding of the Constitution. If so,
Condorcet might find anticipated public outrage relevant not on the
consequentialist grounds discussed thus far, but for an epistemic reason: intense
public opposition is a clue that his interpretation of the Constitution is
incorrect. To make the argument most plausible, let us suppose that
Condorcet's acceptance of propositions lA-IF is inconsistent with the shared
judgment of the President, almost all members of Congress, and the
overwhelming majority of state and local officials and ordinary citizens.
Condorcet might hesitate on grounds of humility; his own view about the
Constitution's meaning might be wrong.
Of course Bickel, and those who share his confidence in judicial capacities,
would have little sympathy for this argument. Recall that Bickel believed that
judges, by virtue of their insulation, are in a particularly good position to
announce the enduring values that the Constitution should be taken to
embody. 89 To the extent that this belief is correct, judges do not have an
epistemic deficit that would justify humility. But Bickel's confidence on this
count is certainly not universally held; indeed it seems strikingly unself-
conscious. Sensible judges are aware of their own fallibility.
A. The Basic Argument
To understand Justice Condorcet's hesitation, consider the Condorcet Jury
Theorem (CJT). 90 Suppose that members of some group are asked to resolve
some question, and each member is at least more than 50% likely to be right.
The CJT says that as the size of the group expands, the likelihood that a
majority of the group will be right approaches 100%. The CJT helps to explain
the "wisdom of crowds," 9 1 that is, the frequent and apparently magical
correctness of large collections of people in making judgments of fact.92 If
many people are asked some question of fact, with one right answer and one
wrong answer, there is a strong likelihood that the majority will be right so long
89. See supra text accompanying note 43.
90. For a sketch, see CAss R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE 25-28 (2006).
91. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 19.
92. An especially helpful discussion is found in PAGE, supra note 19.
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as all or most people are more than 50% likely to be right. Technical work
shows that a similar result holds for plurality judgments about questions with
more than two possible responses.
93
Here is a mundane example from the constitutional domain: Suppose that
there is a dispute about the original understanding of some constitutional
provision-say, about whether the Equal Protection Clause, as originally
understood, forbids racial segregation. Suppose that Condorcet is interested in
the original understanding and that he believes that the Equal Protection Clause
was, in fact, originally understood to ban racial segregation. If it turns out that
Condorcet's view is an outlier and is accepted by almost none of those who
have studied the relevant period, the CJT suggests that Condorcet is probably
wrong. And if most specialists are outraged by Condorcet's conclusion,
Condorcet has particular reason to hesitate on epistemic grounds.
Alert to the CJT, Condorcet might think the following: I accept
propositions IA-IF. But most of the public disagrees with me. If crowds are
wise, I may well be wrong, at least if the public's disagreement bears on an
issue that is relevant to the legal conclusion. It might be useful to make a
distinction here between judgments of fact and judgments of political morality.
Suppose that Condorcet is not an originalist and that he believes that the
constitutionality of capital punishment turns, in part, on whether that form of
punishment has a deterrent effect. On the basis of his own view of the evidence,
Condorcet may doubt that there is any such effect. But if most people believe
that capital punishment does, in fact, have a deterrent effect, then Condorcet
might want to pay careful attention to their beliefs. Perhaps Condorcet is more
interested in the views of specialists than in the views of the public at large; but
if members of the public have some access to relevant information, the view of
a strong majority might bear on the factual question.
By contrast, suppose that the constitutionality of the ban on same-sex
marriage does not turn on disputed facts, but instead on a judgment of political
morality. Suppose that the question is whether the grounds for discriminating
against gays and lesbians, in the particular domain of marriage, are legitimate.
Is the CJT irrelevant? It would be if we believe that moral judgments cannot be
right or wrong. If we are moral relativists or skeptics, we will not have much
interest in the idea of moral truth.94 But suppose we believe that such
judgments are in fact subject to evaluation; if Condorcet's moral views are
relevant to his legal conclusions, he had better share that belief. Even if a moral
judgment is crucial, the views of the public might provide some clues about
what morality in fact requires. If most people reject Condorcet's moral
93. See Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277, 283-88, 295-97 (2001). A good discussion can
also be found in PAGE, supra note 19.
94. A useful, brisk discussion can be found in BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (1972).
[Vol. 60:155
HeinOnline  -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 184 2007-2008
October 2007] SHOULD JUDGES CARE ABOUT OUTRAGE?
conclusions, he might worry that he is missing something or that his
conclusions are wrong.
To come to terms with these possibilities, much will depend on the
prevailing theory of constitutional interpretation. If Condorcet's theory is
originalist, the views of the public might not much matter; as should be evident
and as we shall see in more detail, those views are not likely to tell Condorcet
much about the nature of the original understanding. (Nonetheless, the CJT
suggests that he should be interested in the views of specialists.) But suppose,
with Bickel and many others, that Condorcet's conclusions about the meaning
of the Constitution do in fact depend on some judgment of political morality.95
If so, then the views of others might well be relevant. And indeed, the Court's
decision to strike down criminal bans on same-sex relationships had a great
deal to do with its perceptions of contemporary social values, in a way that
offered at least a hint of an implicit Condorcetian logic.
96
Suppose that Justice Condorcet believes that in cases 1A-IF, he is obliged
to try to bring forward the best justification, in principle, for the fabric of
existing law.9 7 The public's views might provide valuable information about
which justification is best. Of course Condorcet will not be much interested in
those views if they are irrelevant to what matters under his theory of
interpretation (a point to which I will return). A strong division between the
domain of law and the domain of politics and morality would weaken and
possibly eliminate the epistemic argument for attending to public outrage.
B. Who 's Outraged, and What Are They Outraged About?
To sharpen the question, we need to know what proposition, exactly, the
public's outrage can be taken to affirm. The initial objection to the epistemic
argument is that public outrage may not be related to any proposition in which
Justice Condorcet should be interested.
If the public is outraged by 1A-IF, it is most unlikely to be motivated by its
independent interpretation of the Constitution. The outrage is more likely to
reflect a judgment about the actual social risks, speaking empirically, that
would be created by (for example) same-sex or polygamous marriages or
abolition of the death penalty, or about the social values, speaking in purely
moral terms, that the existing practices promote. If the outrage is to matter to
the Condorcetian judge, it must be because the public's judgments on these
points bear on, or overlap with, the judgments that give rise to constitutional
interpretation.
This is hardly unimaginable, at least on certain assumptions about
Condorcet's constitutional method. Condorcet might think that moral
95. See, e.g., DWORKrN, supra note 13.
96. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 576 (2003).
97. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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considerations are relevant to the proper interpretation; if so, the views of the
public might turn out to be relevant. Perhaps the public believes that there is a
legitimate and weighty reason to ban polygamy, and perhaps that belief bears
on the constitutional issue. Perhaps the public believes that under contemporary
conditions, the President needs the authority to commit troops without
congressional authorization, and perhaps that judgment of necessity is relevant
to the meaning of the Constitution.
Or consider another possibility, involving not the public as such but a
relevant segment of it. Perhaps Condorcet should focus not on the public, but
on the outrage of prominent officials who are themselves charged with the duty
of complying with the Constitution. Perhaps the executive branch, and many
legislators, have a considered view about what the Constitution requires with
respect to 1A-1F. If the executive branch thinks that there is no constitutional
problem with the death penalty, or that bans on polygamy are unobjectionable,
then that view may be worth serious consideration.
As I have suggested, a great deal depends on the appropriate constitutional
method. If the executive operates on originalist premises, and if Condorcet
rejects those premises, then the view of the executive and its level of outrage
would appear to be neither here nor there. But suppose that Condorcet is not
sure, in the end, of the appropriate constitutional method. On grounds signaled
by the CJT, Condorcet should hesitate before rejecting a view, even about
method, that is widely held. Perhaps Condorcet's judgment about method will
be influenced by the majority of large groups of people; the CJT suggests that it
ought to be. And if the widely held view depends on a method that he accepts,
he might well attend to it.
Thus far I have assumed that the views of the public are relatively uniform,
on the ground that with that assumption, the epistemic argument for attention to
outrage is most straightforward. But it is far more likely that the public will be
divided. Suppose, for example, that 30% of the public agrees with IA, that 50%
disagrees, and that 20% is unsure; suppose that of those who disagree, only
about two-thirds are genuinely outraged. Or suppose that for 1B, 80% disagree,
20% agree, and 70% of those who disagree are outraged. In the face of
divisions of this kind, judges will have far more difficulty in deciding whether
the epistemic reasons for attention to public outrage are present. The CJT is
most helpful when there is a consensus, or something close to it, on a relevant
proposition from a group most of whose members are more than 50% likely to
be right. I will return to this point below.
C. Biases and Cascades
Sometimes widely held views are uninformative about what is true. If
Americans were asked about the distance between Paris and Nigeria, the
number of federal statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court, or the weight of
the moon, there would be no particular reason to trust the majority's answer. If
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most people are likely to blunder, the average answer, or the majority answer,
has no epistemic credentials. In the constitutional context, there is especially
good reason to think that widespread public judgments deserve little weight.
1. Bias
Suppose, first, that judgments of the public are less than 50% likely to be
right because of some kind of systematic bias. If so, the majority is not likely to
be right. On the contrary, the simple arithmetic behind the CJT shows that the
likelihood that the majority will be wrong approaches 100% as the size of the
group expands! 98 To see the point, begin with an area outside of the domain of
constitutional law: suppose that most people underestimate the number of
people who die from asthma attacks, because the relevant deaths are not
cognitively "available," and the availability heuristic biases their judgments. 99
If so, it is senseless to ask what most people think. Because of a systematic
bias, their judgments will be erroneous.
Now turn to the legal domain and consider the constitutional validity of
statutory bans on racial intermarriage. It should hardly be controversial to
suggest that public disapproval of racial intermarriage is a product of a
systematic bias. Insofar as that disapproval bears on the constitutional issue, it
is easily understood as biased in light of the relevant equal protection norms, in
which Condorcet deserves to have confidence. Very plausibly, public
disapproval of racial intermarriage stems from systematic biases with respect to
facts as well as values. Why should Condorcet pay attention to people's error-
prone judgments?
The general problem is that if Condorcet has good reason to believe that
most people suffer from a kind of prejudice that infects their judgments, he
ought not to pay attention to what they think. And in fact, the real Condorcet
emphasized that "prejudices" can introduce a distortion that makes his
arithmetic unlikely to produce good results: "In effect, when the probability of
the truth of a voter's opinion falls below 1/2, there must be a reason why he
decides less well than one would at random. The reason can only be found in
the prejudices to which this voter is subject." 100 Bickel's emphasis on the
consequentialist grounds for concern with public outrage, and his failure to see
the epistemic grounds, is best understood as a product of a belief that when the
Court and the public diverge, the Court will be right and the public will be
wrong.' 0 1 Perhaps Bickel was far too confident on this count, but we can easily
imagine cases in which judges rightly distrust the public.
98. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 90, at 29-30.
99. See, e.g., Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic
Revisited, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
100. CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 62 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976).
101. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 23-28.
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The question, then, is whether a bias might distort people's judgments with
respect to lA-IF, in which case those judgments have no epistemic value. It
would be entirely plausible for Justice Condorcet to worry about the risk of
such a bias; lA and 1E are especially good candidates.
2. Cascades
The second problem is that people's judgments may be a product of an
informational, moral, or strictly legal cascade, in which case they lack the
independence that the CJT requires. 1
02
a. Basic processes
In an informational cascade, most people form their judgments on the basis
of the actual or apparent judgments of others. 10 3 Consider a stylized example.
Adams says that in her view, the death penalty deters. Barnes does not have a
great deal of private information, but having heard Adams' belief, she agrees
that the death penalty deters. Carlton would have to have reliable information
in order to reject the views of Adams and Barnes-and he lacks that
information. If he follows Adams and Barnes on the ground that their shared
belief is likely to be right, Carlton is in a cascade. Davison, Earnhardt, and
Franklin may well follow the shared views of Adams, Barnes, and Carlton, at
least if they lack private information.
104
It is easy to imagine moral analogues, 10 5 in which Carlton follows Adams
and Barnes, not because they independently agree, but because they do not
have enough confidence in their antecedent moral views to reject the judgments
of others. With respect to same-sex marriage, it is plausible to think that moral
cascades are pervasive. Many people are outraged by same-sex marriage, not
because of their own independent judgments, but because of the real or
apparent moral convictions of trusted others. In the domain of terrorist
behavior, the moral judgments that produce violence are typically a product of
102. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L.
REv. 131 (2006) (exploring the view that courts should take into account decisions of other
courts on the Condorcetian ground that they provide valuable information).
103. See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others:
Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 154-56 (1998).
104. For fascinating experimental evidence, see Robert C. Jacobs & Donald T.
Campbell, The Perpetuation of an Arbitrary Tradition Through Several Generations of a
Laboratory Microculture, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 649 (1961), and Gregory J.
Moschetti, Individual Maintenance and Perpetuation of a Means/Ends Arbitrary Tradition,
40 SOCIOMETRY 78 (1977).
105. See STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE
MODS AND ROCKERS (3d ed. 2002). Of course moral judgments might well be a product of
relevant information, in which case moral cascades are informational cascades too.
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social influences; 10 6 outrage is itself fueled and increased by such influences.
There is no need to speculate about the effects of social influences on juries, for
an experimental study found that jurors' level of outrage is greatly amplified as
a result of deliberative processes. 107 Outrage is demonstrably heightened by the
outrage of others, ensuring that groups are far more outraged after deliberation
than were individual group members prior to deliberation. 10 8
b. Outrage cascades, meaning entrepreneurs, and polarization
Informational and moral cascades might well be responsible for public
outrage in response to a judicial ruling. Suppose, for example, that people
believe that polygamy harms women, or that same-sex marriage is morally
unacceptable, not because of any private information or even judgment, but
because they are reacting to the informational signals given by others. We
could readily imagine constitutional cascades as well, in which the public's
constitutional judgments develop not on the basis of independent assessments
of the merits, but in response to the actual or apparent constitutional judgments
of others. Within the lower courts, legal cascades do seem to develop among
judges. 109
If precedential cascades can be found within the court system, there is
every reason to believe that legal cascades occur within the legal culture, or the
public culture in general, as the constitutional judgments of a few help to
produce an apparently widespread view in favor of one or another position. If
such cascades are widespread or enduring, they might even become self-
confirming, as the widespread judgment becomes entrenched within the public
and eventually within the law.
Cascades might be spontaneous or deliberately induced. Spontaneous
cascades arise because a few early movers express their view in a prominent
way; the early movers increase the salience of the Court's decisions and might
eventually produce widespread outrage. Alternatively, political actors in the
public or private sectors might work very hard to generate a cascade effect,
using the popular media to generate a great deal of public opprobrium. It is
easy to imagine "meaning entrepreneurs," who take it as their task to inculcate
a certain view of constitutional meaning and to spread that view far and wide.
In either case, there is no particular reason to trust the apparent judgments of
106. See Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maletkovdi, Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is
There a Causal Connection?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 119 (2003) (suggesting that terrorism
"is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings
of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics").
107. See David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000).
108. Id.
109. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment:
Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158 (1999).
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large groups on Condorcetian grounds. By hypothesis, such groups are
responding to the beliefs of only a few. A precondition for deference to the
wisdom of the crowd-a large number of independent judgments-is absent.
There is a related point. Through the process of group polarization, it is
well established that deliberation tends to move people to a more extreme
position in line with their predeliberation tendencies.' Imagine, for example,
that like-minded citizens are speaking together about a decision of the Supreme
Court and begin with a level of disapproval; their discussions may well increase
mere disapproval to outrage. I 1' When deliberation leads juries to greater levels
of outrage, group polarization is often responsible. 1 2 In general, outrage may
well be a product of the kinds of social influences that produce polarization. It
follows that if the public is outraged by a Supreme Court decision, group
polarization may be responsible. To the extent that this is so, Justice Condorcet
will likely conclude that outrage lacks epistemic credentials because it is not a
product of the independent judgments that can make large groups wise.
3. Hesitation and humility without the CJT
Most generally, and even without speaking of a systematic bias or social
influences, Condorcet might well want to ask himself this question: is it really
the case that many or most members of the public are more likely than not to
provide correct answers to legally relevant questions of fact and morality? If
morality is pertinent to constitutional adjudication, Condorcet might be puzzled
by the suggestion that most people will answer the key questions correctly.
Suppose that Condorcet is exploring some constitutional question associated
with racial segregation, free speech in a time of war, the Establishment Clause,
or discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. Why-Condorcet might
wonder-should I believe that most people are more than 50% likely to provide
the right answer to the underlying question?
If Condorcet cannot answer this question, and hence finds the CJT
irrelevant, it remains possible that he will hesitate on epistemic grounds before
rejecting the views of the majority. He might believe that the issue is
comparative: is the public more likely, or less likely, to be right than are federal
judges?1 3 Does the answer to this question change if the public is genuinely
outraged? If Condorcet is an originalist, he will be confident that the public's
views do not much matter. If he follows Bickel and thinks that judges have a
unique ability to discern evolving values, he will not be greatly interested in
110. See David Schkade et al., What Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CAL. L. REv.
915 (2007).
111. See Nadler et al., supra note 78 (discussing public outrage over the Court's
decision in Kelo).
112. See Schkade et al., supra note 107, at 1164.
113. Cf PAGE, supra note 19, at 209-11 (suggesting that on factual questions, diverse
groups regularly outperform individuals).
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what the public thinks. We can therefore find a temporary epistemic alliance (a
truce?), in rejecting the views of the public, between originalists and many of
those who believe that the Constitution's meaning evolves over time.
But Condorcet might observe that the Court consists of nine lawyers-
mostly white, mostly male, mostly wealthy, and mostly old (or at least not
young). In light of that fact, he might believe that judges are at an epistemic
disadvantage in answering some important questions-perhaps because of their
relative lack of diversity, 114 perhaps because they are the ones who are likely to
suffer from a systematic bias. If Condorcet thinks in this way, and if he believes
that judgments of fact or morality bear on constitutional meaning, he might
well be interested in the widely held views of the public.
D. A Practical Problem and Condorcet's Conclusion
In theory, these points are straightforward. In practice, they create serious
problems for those who invoke epistemic grounds for considering public
outrage. Suppose that Condorcet is a humble judge, alert to his own fallibility,
who wants to consider the views of others unless there is a systematic bias, a
cascade effect, or group polarization. Condorcet must decide whether a bias, a
cascade, or polarization is at work. Suppose, first, that he has unerring tools for
making that decision. If so, there is no particular problem; he knows when the
circumstances are right for consulting the public's view. But if Condorcet really
does have such tools, he probably knows a great deal, and he might well be
able to rely on his own judgment. If so, he need not worry about what other
people think.
Suppose, as is far more realistic, that he lacks such tools. To know whether
the public suffers from a relevant bias or thinks as it does because of a cascade
or polarization, Condorcet has to answer some hard questions---conceptual,
normative, and empirical. As a judge, he will likely lack the tools to answer
them well. Realistically, his own views about the merits, in cases lA-IF, will
undoubtedly influence his answers. If most people disagree with him, he is
likely to conclude that they do, in fact, suffer from some kind of bias. There is a
pervasive risk that any judge, asking whether the preconditions for collective
wisdom are met, will answer the question affirmatively only when he already
agrees with what people think.
Let us imagine that Condorcet can overcome this problem and approach
the underlying questions in an acceptably neutral way. Is it possible for him to
know when a bias, a cascade, or polarization is at work? In the abstract, we can
imagine how he might make progress on that question. Perhaps his theory of
interpretation permits him to consider certain judgments to be "biases" in a
constitutionally relevant sense. Perhaps he believes that if most people oppose
racial intermarriage, or same-sex marriage, on moral grounds, those very
114. See id. at 207-12 (emphasizing comparative accuracy of diverse groups).
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grounds are illicit under the proper theory of (say) the Equal Protection Clause.
Perhaps the public is split along lines that suggest, or do not suggest, some kind
of bias. If a relatively weak group is not outraged, and if an identifiably
powerful group is outraged, Condorcet might conclude that a bias is likely to be
at work. Perhaps the existence of outrage among powerful groups, whose
interests are conspicuously at stake, does not have much epistemic value
because of the risk of bias.11 5 With respect to cascade effects and polarization,
Condorcet must inquire into the social and political dynamics by which the
public thinks as it does.
Perhaps Condorcet would like to consult the wisdom of the crowd to obtain
an answer to the meta-question whether there is a bias, a cascade, or
polarization, but on the meta-question, a bias, a cascade, or polarization may
also be at work (and so too on the meta-meta-question). Perhaps Condorcet can
work with presumptions of one or another kind. If he is particularly humble, he
will find a bias or suspect a cascade or polarization only if he is very firmly
convinced that one or the other is present.
All in all, the epistemic argument for considering public outrage emerges
as intelligible but quite fragile-more so than the consequentialist argument.
For the epistemic argument to have any force at all, public outrage must reflect
a consensus on some proposition of fact or value that bears on the legal
conclusion. Even if it does so, such outrage may be a product of a systematic
bias or the kinds of social influence involved in cascades and polarization.
Judges lack good tools for investigating these questions. If there is a consensus
within the relevant community on a question of law, or on a question that bears
on the right answer to a question of law, then judges might pay attention to that
consensus. But in hard constitutional cases, a consensus will be rare, and in any
case the judges will be unlikely to want to rule in a way that rejects it.' 1 6
E. Beyond Outrage (Again)
To the extent that the epistemic point is taken seriously, we might well
wonder about the focus on outrage. 1 17 Perhaps outrage is simply an extreme
point along a continuum of disapproval, starting with mild disagreement and
115. Condorcet has to be careful here. What groups count as powerful, and what
groups count as powerless, may not be a mere question of fact; it might well have a
normative component as well. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (discussing how to distinguish groups that deserve special
protection under Carolene Products). And if a powerful group is large, Condorcet might
hesitate before rejecting its view, notwithstanding its power.
116. See Dahl, supra note 3, at 283-91 (showing that courts rarely reject a public
consensus); PUBLIC OPINiON AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al.
eds., forthcoming 2008).
117. Cf Posner & Sunstein, supra note 102 (arguing that general practice of states and
nations has epistemic value, and not concentrating on outrage or any particular affective
state).
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culminating in outrage. Under the CJT, what matters is numerosity, not
intensity. Suppose that 90% of the public believes that the Court would be
wrong to strike down bans on polygamous marriages, or to rule that the
President lacks the authority to commit troops to combat an apparent threat. At
first glance, outrage is not important. What matters is whether the underlying
judgment is widely held.
As I have noted, the Court's decision to invalidate a ban on same-sex
sodomy seemed to have a great deal to do with a belief that invalidation fit with
emerging social values.1l l Thus the Court said that "[i]n the United States
criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its
reasoning in all respects,"' 119 and the Court emphasized "an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives . ,,120 And if nonjudicial actors would
disagree with a decision, that point might seem relevant too, even if their
disagreement is much milder than outrage. Armed with an understanding of
some of the arguments thus far, we can better appreciate two time-honored
views about the appropriate role of the judiciary in American government.
1. Thayerism. Consider in this light the view associated with James
Bradley Thayer, which asks judges to defer to any plausible understanding of
the Constitution, at least if the understanding came from Congress. 12 1 Thayer
argued that because the American Constitution is often ambiguous, those who
decide on its meaning must inevitably exercise discretion. 122 Thayer's
argument, in brief, was that courts should strike down national legislation only
"when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake,
but have made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational
question."' 123 The question for courts "is not one of the mere and simple
preponderance of reasons for or against, but of what is very plain and clear,
clear beyond a reasonable doubt."
' 124
Thayer was concerned about public judgments in general, not about
outrage in particular. There is an unmistakable Condorcetian dimension to
Thayer's own argument for the view that courts should uphold congressional
decisions unless they are unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt."'12 5 If
the public and its representatives, who have their own duty of fidelity to the
118. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 576 (2003).
119. Id. at 576.
120. Id. at 572.
121. See VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 254; Thayer, supra note 15.
122. See Thayer, supra note 15, at 144 (noting that laws "which will seem
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; ... the
constitution often admits of different interpretations; ... there is often a range of choice and
judgment").
123. Id.
124. Id. at 151.
125. Id.
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document, have understood a constitutional provision in a certain way, then the
Court should pay respectful attention to their views. At the very least, a point of
this kind provides a plausible reason for the Court to take account of the
constitutional conclusions of other branches of the national government, 126 and
perhaps of the constitutional judgments of the high courts of other nations. 127 If
other branches have focused squarely on the constitutional question and
reached a consensus in favor of one or another view, the Court might well pay
attention for epistemic reasons.
2. Social commitments and the place of consensus. On an alternative view,
the Court should pay close attention to existing social commitments in deciding
when and whether to strike down legislation. Indeed, some of the most
aggressive invalidations by the Court have been defended on the ground that
they reflect widespread social judgments. 128 In some cases, the Court has
explicitly referred to such judgments as a basis for invalidating legislation.129
At first glance, it is puzzling to suggest that the Supreme Court should strike
statutes down on this ground; if a statute is inconsistent with public
commitments, it is likely to be changed or repealed in any event. 130 But some
statutes, especially at the state level, may reflect judgments of fact or morality
that are not in line with the views of the public at large. If this is so, and if the
Court can reliably measure public convictions, there is a plausible
Condorcetian justification for taking them into account, at least on a certain
view of constitutional interpretation.
Interesting debates might be imagined between modern Thayerians, who
are reluctant to invalidate legislation on epistemic grounds, and those who are
willing to do so on those same grounds. Thayerians would be tempted to
emphasize the lack of good tools by which judges might measure public
convictions; their adversaries would respond that it is extravagant to identify
any particular statute, especially at the state level, with the will of the public.
What is of interest here is that both sides are likely to raise a simple question:
what makes outrage distinctive, if the epistemic argument is the governing one?
If an answer exists, it is that outrage suggests a degree of both confidence
and intensity, in a way that strengthens the epistemic credentials of the public
judgment. Recall that under the CJT, a successful answer from a large group
can be expected if most people are at least more that 50% likely to be right. The
126. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (holding that when
Congress has specifically considered the question of an act's constitutionality the
"customary deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly appropriate").
127. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 102.
128. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 3 (defending Brown on such grounds); RICHARD
A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 324 (reprint ed. 1994) (defending Griswold on such grounds);
Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 297-311 (1973) (defending Roe on such grounds).
129. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
130. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181-83 (1980).
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key point is that if most people are confident that they are right, we might be
able to find that the conditions for a correct group answer are more likely to be
present. When people are less confident of a position, their views tend to
moderate; 13 1 it is hard to be outraged without a degree of confidence.
Moreover, confidence is correlated with accuracy. 132 Of course confident
people are often wrong. But confidence has been found to be "associated with
correctness for both individual and group performance."' 133 We might therefore
think that when the public is outraged, it is more likely to be confident, and
hence its members are more likely to be right.
It is true that these points must be taken with many grains of salt. People
might be confident about some highly technical issue of law, but they might not
be outraged if judges give the wrong answer, simply because the issue is highly
technical and little might turn on its resolution. Alternatively, people might be
outraged even though they are not entirely confident, simply because the stakes
are so high. Perhaps outrage, when it exists, is associated with a systematic bias
or a cascade effect or polarization. Certainly it is plausible to say that those
who have been subject to the processes that tend to produce polarization are
more likely to be outraged. Hence outrage is an imperfect proxy for confidence,
just as confidence is an imperfect proxy for accuracy. 134
131. See Robert S. Baron et al., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 537, 538 (1996) (suggesting that confidence produces more
extremity, with the implication that a lack of confidence produces moderation).
132. See Reid Hastie, Review Essay: Experimental Evidence of Group Accuracy, in
INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 129, 133-46 (Bernard Grofman &
Guillermo Owen eds., 1983).
133. See id. at 148.
134. The analysis thus far has broader implications. The tension between judicial
review and democracy qualifies as such only on the basis of certain understandings of both
judicial capacities and democracy itself The tension is serious if we believe that democratic
self-government requires the public, and not the judges, to decide relevant moral questions.
But why, exactly, might we think that? The consequentialist and epistemic arguments help to
provide answers.
If Thayerism is understood through a Condorcetian lens, a deferential judicial role is
best defended on the ground that the public is far more likely to be right than the federal
judiciary. An evident problem with this position is that a systematic bias, a cascade, or
polarization might have led the public in the wrong direction; an additional problem is that
the views of the public may not involve any proposition that bears on constitutional
meaning. If Thayerism is understood in consequentialist terms, the argument would be that
even if judges have special access to the document's meaning, the results will be better, at
least on occasion, if they attend to the public's view. It is certainly open for a
consequentialist to believe that self-government is an intrinsic as well as an instrumental
good, and that any decision to thwart the democratic will creates a bad consequence by
definition. My goal with these brief remarks is not to take sides in this large debate, but to
specify some of the grounds on which democratic objections to judicial review might be both
defended and challenged.
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Ili. OUTRAGE AND VALIDATIONS (WITH NOTES ON STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION)
A. The Problem
The public might be outraged by validations as well as by invalidations.
Indeed, the public reaction to Supreme Court decisions seems to depend on the
merits, not on whether the Supreme Court has upheld or struck down the
decisions of the elected branches. If the Court ruled tomorrow that racial
segregation by state governments is constitutionally unobjectionable, an intense
reaction would be entirely predictable. If the Court said next week that the Bill
of Rights does not apply to the states, the public would indeed be outraged. Let
us imagine, then, a Justice Thayer, who accepts the following propositions:
2A. The President's national wiretapping program13 5 does not violate the
Constitution.
2B. The Establishment Clause does not apply to the states; it follows that
mandatory school prayer, at the state level, does not violate the Clause.
2C. The Takings Clause allows the government to characterize any
minimally plausible justification as a "public use, " so as to allow it to take
private property so long as compensation is paid. 1
36
Justice Thayer accepts these propositions because he is a good Thayerian;
he does not believe that the Court should invalidate acts of government unless
the constitutional violation is plain. 137 That belief might itself stem from a
number of possible foundations. Perhaps Thayer is a democrat, one who
believes that the people have a right to govern themselves, and who thinks that
judicial use of ambiguous constitutional provisions to invalidate legislation is in
tension with the very idea of democratic self-government. Perhaps more
promisingly, we might suppose that Thayer is a consequentialist who believes
that things will simply be better if judges adopt a general posture or rule of
restraint.138 Let us simply stipulate that Thayer has been led to his Thayerism,
and hence to propositions 2A-2C, on rule-consequentialist grounds.
Assume that the public would be outraged by any of these decisions. It
should be immediately clear that cases 2A-2C are importantly different from
cases IA-IF, because the former involve validation of government decisions.
How, if at all, should Justice Thayer take account of the prospect of public
135. For a discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National
Security: Hamdan and Beyond, Sup. CT. REv. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-922406. Thayer himself emphasized the need to defer to Congress,
not state governments or the President; I understand Justice Thayer, and Thayerism more
generally, to suggest a broader posture of restraint.
136. Cf Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (offering a broad
interpretation of the "public use" requirement).
137. See Thayer, supra note 15.
138. See VERMEULE, supra note 17 (defending a form of Thayerism on
consequentialist grounds).
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outrage? How, if at all, should his analysis differ from that of Justices Bentham
and Condorcet in cases IA-IF?
If these questions seem puzzling and exotic, we might note that outrage
does play an explicit role in several areas of constitutional law, and here the
Court has used outrage as a reason for invalidating rather than upholding
legislation. In an early substantive due process case, the Court asked whether a
disputed practice would "shock[] the conscience" in a way that would "offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples . . . ,139 In deciding whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual, the Court refers to "evolving standards of decency," 140 an inquiry
that is meant to attend to public judgments about what kinds of punishments are
morally acceptable or instead beyond the bounds of "decency" (and in that
sense outrageous).
There seems to be an implicit Condorcetian dimension to these rulings,
with the suggestion that widespread moral disapproval-and it is agreed that
the disapproval needs to be widespreadl 4'-is a measure of the moral
acceptability of the practice. Insofar as the Court refers to evolving social
values in due process cases, 142 its decisions can also be taken in Condorcetian
terms.
B. Thayerians and Outrage
Let us stipulate that Thayer is a consequentialist and that he is not
committed to Kantian adjudication as a matter of abstract principle. Indeed, let
us stipulate that Thayer is a Thayerian for consequentialist reasons; he believes
that if judges uphold legislation whenever there is reasonable doubt, the
consequences will be good.14 3 As a consequentialist, Thayer is certainly willing
to pay attention to outrage, at least if it will have harmful effects. But at first
glance, cases 2A-2C are importantly different from cases IA-IF because even
if outrage is present, it has a simple outlet: the public can turn its outrage into
legislation. If the public opposes the President's national wiretapping program,
it can ban it. If the public wants to forbid school prayer, it can do so, certainly
at the state level and potentially through national legislation as well; Thayer
himself would be reluctant to invalidate national legislation to this effect. If
state or national governments seek to impose fresh restrictions on public
takings of private property, they can do exactly that. I will qualify this
argument shortly. But because public corrections are possible, the
139. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
140. The test originated in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
141. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-68 (2005) (evaluating whether there
was truly a "national consensus" against imposition of a juvenile death penalty and finding it
persuasive that a majority of states had rejected such a penalty).
142. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 576 (2003).
143. See VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 239.
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consequentialist arguments for taking account of outrage are, at the very least,
much weakened in the case of validations.
Now turn to the question of humility. Even if Thayer thinks that he might
be wrong, the stakes are significantly lower than in cases 1A-IF, again because
there is a democratic corrective for Thayer's error. Indeed, Thayer's
willingness to validate legislation, in cases 2A-2C and more generally, might
itself be influenced by a kind of rough-and-ready Condorcetianism. If
legislation has been enacted, the public probably favors it, or at least does not
greatly disapprove of it; and if the public approves, Thayer has some reason to
believe that the legislation is justified in terms of facts and values (supposing
again a theory of interpretation for which public approval has epistemic value).
Of course well-organized private groups might be responsible for legislation,
and the public might not care or might even disagree with it; but as a humble
judge, Thayer is probably unwilling to ask hard questions about that possibility.
The major point is that even if the CJT does not strongly support Thayerism, a
Thayerian judge can rest content with the knowledge that if the public is truly
outraged by validation of legislation, it can respond with an amendment or
repeal.
If Thayer puts the consequentialist and epistemic points together, he is not
likely to be affected by the prospect of public outrage at validations. The
consequences of validations that produce outrage are not likely to be especially
damaging, and because he is dealing with measures that have passed through
democratic channels, the existence of outrage will usually lack much epistemic
weight.
The question of statutory interpretation can be understood in similar terms.
Perhaps people would be very upset if the Court ruled that the Endangered
Species Act forbids some important project, or that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 bans affirmative action. But even if such rulings produce outrage, the
public can respond with legislative change. For this reason, the consequentialist
objection is greatly weakened. The epistemic argument is more difficult.
Suppose that a statute is genuinely ambiguous and that all or almost all
members of the (pertinent) community believe that it should be construed in a
certain way. 144 For Condorcetian reasons, it may make sense to pay attention to
the views of relevant others. 145 But on standard views about statutory
interpretation, public outrage is likely to offer no relevant information at all.
144. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), famously holds that courts must respect agency interpretations of ambiguous terms,
so long as those interpretations are reasonable. Chevron can therefore be understood as a
testimonial to judicial humility in the face of statutory ambiguity, not for Condorcetian
reasons, but because of a belief in the superior accountability and technical specialization of
the relevant agency.
145. Cf Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2027 (2002) (arguing that statutes might be interpreted by reference to the preferences
of the current legislature).
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Suppose that the public wants to permit affirmative action, or to limit the reach
of the Endangered Species Act. Its desires may well tell us exactly nothing
about the proper interpretation of the relevant statutes. 
146
Of course the prevailing theory of statutory interpretation is critical here. If
questions of political morality matter to that theory, public outrage might be
pertinent. 147 If the views of the current legislature are relevant, an outraged
legislature, and hence an outraged public, might be worthy of attention. 14 8 But
if the judge's view is a product of the statutory text, structure, and history, the
views of the public, and its likely outrage, would seem uninformative. And to
the extent that public outrage does offer some kind of signal that the Court may
be wrong, there is far less reason for concern, because the Court's error can be
corrected. In any case, it is not clear that in the domain of statutory
interpretation, public judgments provide any relevant information about
whether the Court is correct.
C. Complications
These points are not necessarily decisive. It is often difficult to enact new
legislation or to amend statutes, even when there is general agreement that such
legislation or such an amendment is a good idea. In the constitutional domain, a
consequentialist judge might be somewhat more inclined to strike down an
enactment if validation would produce widespread outrage; and if the views of
the public do have epistemic value, perhaps outrage at the prospect of
validation could operate as a tie-breaker or somewhat more. The democratic
objections to judicial invalidation seem weakened if the public would be
greatly disturbed by validation. 149 As we have seen, the Court does, in some
areas of the law, consider widespread public outrage as a reason to invalidate
legislation. 1
50
In the abstract, the idea of outrage at validations might seem puzzling, but
it is certainly imaginable that officials in one state, or a few states, might take
action of which the general public greatly disapproves.151 Such officials might,
for example, take private property, 152 or impose restrictions on the right to
choose abortion (say, in cases of rape or incest), in a way that triggers genuine
146. But see id.
147. See DWORKIN, supra note 97.
148. See Elhauge, supra note 145.
149. Consider Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Court
struck down a ban on the use of contraceptives by married people, a ban that was limited to
two states and that was widely regarded as indefensible or even outrageous within the nation.
See POSNER, supra note 128, at 326. In a federal system, it is entirely predictable that one
state will sometimes engage in actions that other states will find outrageous.
150. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
151. See Nadler et al., supra note 78 (considering such widespread disapproval with
respect to Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
152. See id.
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outrage. Perhaps legislation in one or another state is itself a product of a
cascade effect or of group polarization, depriving such legislation of epistemic
credentials. In invalidating the decisions of one or a few states, the Court might
be vindicating widespread judgments against a small minority. Validation of
legislation generally perceived to be outrageous might also trigger fears of
other abridgements of important rights and interests; imagine a decision to
validate a restriction on the right to use contraceptives. In most real-world
cases, of course, the public is likely to be divided, and a national consensus in
opposition to the law that is being validated should be rare.1 53 But even if most
of the public would be outraged by validation, it might not be so easy to
produce a legislative corrective, at least not if a particular state is a genuine
outlier or if a well-organized set of interests opposes that corrective.
In a very hard case of statutory interpretation, perhaps a consequentialist
judge, or a humble one, should construe a statute so as to avoid public outrage;
perhaps that is the right course when the judge is otherwise in or close to
equipoise. 154 But if judges cannot reliably decide whether outrage would be
present, it is far more plausible to say that they should simply refuse to consider
the prospect of outrage at all.
It follows that in the context of validations and statutory interpretation,
there is a strong rule-consequentialist argument for refusing to consider public
outrage in deciding what to do. If courts refuse to take account of outrage, they
need not undertake an inquiry that might be difficult. As we have seen, judges
may not have excellent or even decent tools for knowing whether outrage
would be present, or what consequences would result from outrage, or what
epistemic credentials outrage might have. It follows that Justice Thayer will be
inclined not to take account of outrage and will vote his convictions, as
expressed in 2A-2C.
IV. ORIGINALISM, MORAL READINGS, AND OUTRAGED MINORITIES
I have emphasized that the argument for considering outrage is sensitive to
the prevailing theory of interpretation. If a judge accepts originalism or is
committed to moral readings of the Constitution, the analysis must be
somewhat different. It must be similarly altered if outrage is felt by a minority
rather than a majority.
153. But see Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. Validation of the statute in Griswold, even in
1965, would have met widespread public disapproval. See POSNER, supra note 128, at 324-
31.
154. Cf DWORKIN, supra note 97, at 148.
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A. Originalism
Assume that Justice Berger is an originalist; she believes that the meaning
of the Constitution is settled by the original understanding of the ratifiers. She
accepts the following propositions:
155
3A. The Second Amendment forbids (some or all) existing gun control
legislation.
3B. Article I section 1 prohibits the creation of independent regulatory
agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board.
3C. The Equal Protection Clause does not ban discrimination on the basis
of sex.
Let us suppose too that Berger is deciding how to cast the deciding vote on
an evenly divided Supreme Court. Suppose finally that under Berger's
approach to constitutional interpretation, stare decisis is not controlling; when
the Court's precedents are egregiously wrong, as she believes that they are in
these domains, the Constitution should prevail, not the precedents.156 At the
same time, Berger believes, in cases 3A-3C, that a ruling would produce a great
deal of public outrage.
1. Originalism and consequences
Berger's reaction to the prospect of outrage might well depend on why,
exactly, she is an originalist. Suppose that she is an originalist because of her
judgment about what is entailed by the very idea of interpretation. 157 She
believes that attention to the original understanding is required if judges are to
"interpret" the founding document rather than to make it up. If so, she is
unlikely to care about intense public opposition. Judges are obliged to interpret
the document, and the results do not matter.
But by virtue of her theory of interpretation, Justice Berger is not
compelled to reason in this way. She might believe that originalism is entailed
by the very idea of interpretation, but her theory of adjudication might be
consequentialist, in the sense that she believes that actions, including judicial
actions, must be judged by reference to their consequences. Justice Berger
might therefore be interested in the possibility of exercising the "passive
virtues." On this view, the appropriate steps, by judges who are originalists, are
155. 1 do not mean to suggest that these positions are, in fact, compelled by the
original understanding.
156. This is apparently Justice Thomas's view; Justice Scalia has said that Justice
Thomas "doesn't believe in stare decisis, period.... [I]f a constitutional line of authority is
wrong, [Thomas] would say 'Let's get it right.' I wouldn't do that." Stephen B. Presser,
Touting Thomas, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 68, 68-69, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/review_presserjanfeb05.msp.
157. See Prakash, supra note 36, at 2210-11.
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legitimately influenced by the consequences of those steps. Such an originalist
would not be inclined to defy the original understanding in order to avoid bad
consequences. But she might seek to avoid the key questions on grounds of
justiciability-certainly if the invocation of those grounds is defensible, or
(preferably) right, on originalist grounds. In short, Justice Berger might have a
nonconsequentialist theory of interpretation but also a consequentialist theory
of adjudication, at least for purposes of deciding whether to exercise the
passive virtues.
Consider a different type of originalist, one who considers originalism to
be "the lesser evil," 15 8 in the sense that it will produce better results than any
other approach to interpretation. For such an originalist, the justification of
originalism is itself consequentialist. On this view, originalism is likely to
produce the best outcomes, all things considered. Consider the illuminating
suggestion by Randy Barnett, a committed originalist: "Given a sufficiently
good constitutional text, originalists maintain that better results will be reached
overall if government officials-including judges-must stick to the original
meaning rather than empowering them to trump that meaning with one that
they prefer."
159
Originalists who defend their approach on this consequentialist ground
might consider public opposition to be highly relevant. If Justice Berger is an
originalist for consequentialist reasons, she is unlikely to favor originalism
though the heavens may fall. The consequentialist considerations that justify
originalism might lead this kind of originalist to try to avoid rulings of the sort
indicated by 3A-3C, certainly if the consequences of such rulings would be
very bad. Such an originalist would not interpret the Constitution in a way that
violates the originalist understanding, but here too justiciability doctrines might
be invoked to prevent the most radical rulings. Of course this result is not
compelled. An originalist might believe that an insistence on originalism,
producing 3A-3C, would yield good results, not bad ones, even if the public is
outraged. The only point is that certain kinds of originalists would be entirely
willing to take account of consequences and hence of outrage.
2. Originalism and epistemology
For originalists of any kind, humility and the CJT are much less likely to
be important considerations. Why should an originalist care if most Americans
believe that the Constitution allows gun control legislation or independent
regulatory commissions, or forbids sex discrimination? The public consensus
tells us little and probably nothing about the original understanding. Surely
judges should pay attention if other originalists read the history in a way that is
158. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CrN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
159. Posting of Randy Barnett to Debate Club, Constitution in Exile?,
http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclubcie05O5.msp (May 3, 2005, 1:43 P.M.).
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consistent with propositions 3A-3C. But public outrage, as such, is neither here
nor there.
The only qualification arises if other branches of government have decided,
on originalist assumptions, to reject propositions 3A-3C. Perhaps originalists
should also be Condorcetians, not in the sense that they should care about the
views of the general public, but in the sense that they ought to attend to the
consensus of those who use their preferred method. Here too, of course, a
systemic bias, a cascade effect, or group polarization might be at work. If
members of other branches reject 3A because of such a bias, or if their
judgment on 3C is a result of a legal cascade, there is no reason to pay careful
attention to their opinions.
B. Moral Readings
Suppose that propositions 1A-IF are supported by a "moral reading" of the
Constitution, which asks judges to treat the founding document as establishing
moral aspirations, which they should attempt to place in the best possible light,
consistent with respect for the past. 160 Much of constitutional law does seem to
reflect some kind of moral reading, for judicial judgments about the best moral
understanding of constitutional principles play an occasionally large role in the
Court's conclusions. 16 1 For judges who are committed to moral readings,
should public outrage receive consideration? Let us consider how Justice
Hercules, 16 2 a moral reader of the Constitution in the (fortunate?) position of
being able to resolve cases on which his colleagues are split 4-4, would
approach the consequentialist and epistemic arguments.
At first glance, Justice Hercules is most unlikely to be impressed by those
arguments. The point of the moral reading is to say (for example) how liberty
and equality are best conceived in light of our practices; often the moral
reading will run in the face of the public will, and sometimes the moral reading
will produce outrage (if only because the existing practice is outrageous). For
moral readers, the problems of school segregation, censorship, and sex
discrimination are likely to loom large; and in all of those domains, the Court
was willing to risk public outrage. 163 If Justice Hercules attends to public
outrage, he might not give proper moral readings at all; consider lA-IF in this
light. There is a further difficulty. Those drawn to moral readings tend to be
160. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996).
161. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
162. See DWORKIN, supra note 97, at 239.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (sex discrimination);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (censorship); Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (school
desegregation).
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deontologists, not consequentialists. 164 Insofar as attention to outrage is
justified on consequentialist grounds, the justification would seem uninteresting
to those who endorse moral readings.
But this conclusion may be premature; both consequential and epistemic
reasons may be available. Justice Hercules should not welcome futile or self-
defeating judicial rulings. As we have seen, deontologists do, and should,
recognize the possibility of consequentialist overrides. It follows that if the
consequences of outrage are bad enough, Justice Hercules should pay attention
to them. It is certainly possible for judges to favor moral readings of the
Constitution, and to see such readings in deontological terms, while also
holding a consequentialist account of adjudication. The "all deliberate speed"
formulation need not be rejected by those who believe that racial segregation is
intrinsically wrong.
Moral readers might also be persuaded that insofar as public outrage is a
signal of widely held moral convictions, it may well be worth attention for
epistemic reasons, subject to the qualifications noted above. Suppose that the
relevant moral readers are humble; they believe that the Constitution's broad
phrases should be read in the best constructive light, but they also agree that the
Court's own answers are fallible. Humble readers, moral or otherwise, might
pay attention to the public's judgments, perhaps especially if those judgments
are intensely held. If the public's conception of liberty and equality is
consistent with some practice, and if judicial validation of that practice would
produce outrage, judges might pay attention to those facts.
Of course moral readers will be alert to the risks catalogued above. The
public's judgment might not show support for any relevant proposition; the
public might be subject to a systematic bias; members of the public might be in
a cascade, or might be affected by group polarization. But if moral readers lack
confidence in their own moral judgments, they might be willing to attend to
public judgments on epistemic grounds.
C. Outraged Minorities and Actual Practices
The discussion thus far has assumed that the public as a whole would be
outraged. This is a useful simplifying assumption, because it makes the
consequentialist and epistemic issues more tractable. But most of the time, it is
far more likely that public outrage will be limited to a minority and that most
people will either approve of the Court's decision or at least not be outraged by
it. When a minority is outraged, its reaction is not likely to be translated into
law. How does all this bear on the normative question?
Begin with the Court's actual practices. There are few cases in which the
Court's decision produced outrage within a strong majority of the public; the
164. See DWORKIN, supra note 160; FLEMING, supra note 41.
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most obvious examples are the Court's flag-burning 16 5 and school prayer
decisions 166 and, even there, no constitutional amendment has come close to
ratification. The Court's Kelo decision 167 attracted widespread disapproval,
16 8
but most of the Court's highly controversial decisions-involving school
segregation 169 and abortion 17 --have spurred real outrage in segments of the
public, not the nation as a whole. This fact suggests either that the Court is
highly sensitive to the risks associated with widespread outrage, or more
plausibly that political controls on the Court ensure that the Justices rarely
(seek to) produce outrageous results. Because of the appointments process,171
the justices are controlled, to some extent, by popular will; it is therefore most
unlikely that they would favor an interpretation of the Constitution that all or
most of the public would regard as not only wrong but outrageously so.
How do the consequentialist and epistemic arguments fare in the context of
views intensely held by a minority? The epistemic point is easier to handle.
Justice Condorcet is not likely to be much moved by learning that a minority of
the public strongly rejects his reading of the Constitution. If the majority agrees
with him, or is indifferent, the diversity of views within the community
deprives the judgments of the minority of much in the way of epistemic
credentials. Of course matters would be different if the minority consisted
solely of neutral people, or of specialists whose views were entitled to
particular respect. But minority opposition, even if intensely felt, will not
greatly influence Condorcet.
The consequentialist arguments are less significantly affected. For Justice
Bentham, the question is whether outrage, localized as it may be, is likely to
ensure futile or perverse outcomes, or overall bad consequences. If a minority
is willing and able to resist a proposed remedy, the Court would do well to
consider a remedy that will be more effective. If a minority is able to ensure
that a result will be counterproductive, the analysis is not radically different
from what it is if a majority is involved. The major difference is that if a
majority approves of the Court's decision, or does not disapprove, the
likelihood of bad consequences is reduced-not eliminated, but reduced.
165. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). As many as 79% of Americans
disapproved of this decision. Nadler et al., supra note 78, at 16.
166. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The rate of
disapproval of the Court's school prayer decisions was as high as 67% in the period 1974-
2005. Nadler et al., supra note 78, at 16.
167. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
168. See Nadler et al., supra note 78, at 16 (reporting 80-90% disapproval rate).
169. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Here the disapproval rate ranged
from 40-45%. Nadler et al., supra note 78, at 16.
170. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
171. See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005).
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V. NONJUDICIAL ACTORS: BENTHAM AND CONDORCET IN THE DEMOCRATIC
BRANCHES
My emphasis throughout has been on the question whether judges should
attend to public outrage. In this final Part, I explore two related questions. The
first is the relationship between popular constitutionalism and the arguments
thus far; the second involves the implications of the argument for elected
officials.
A. We the People
In recent years, many people have expressed interest in "popular
constitutionalism"-in the view, with some roots in the founding period, that
the meaning of the Constitution might be ultimately settled by We the People,
not by the federal judiciary.' 72 On this view, the interpretations of the Supreme
Court lack finality; the public is entitled to have the ultimate say, not because it
has ratified any constitutional amendment, but because it has settled on its own
view about how the document is best understood. A related but more modest
position emphasizes that other branches of government have an independent
duty to be faithful to the Constitution, and that this independent duty calls for a
degree of interpretive independence. 173
On a prominent version of this view, courts systematically "underenforce"
the Constitution, because of their awareness of their own institutional
limitations.' 74 It follows that the President and Congress might disapprove of
(say) affirmative action or bans on same-sex marriage on constitutional
grounds, and take their own steps to prevent, and in a sense to invalidate, those
same practices. When elected officials read the Constitution more expansively
than does the Court, they might be acting perfectly legitimately; they do not
face the same limitations that the Court does, and hence they are entitled to be
more aggressive with it. It is not difficult to find examples of situations in
which public officials, animated by their own views of constitutional
commands, extended constitutional barriers in ways that the Supreme Court
refused to do. 175
172. See KRAMER, supra note 4.
173. See FLEMING, supra note 41.
174. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
175. Note, for example, President Reagan's executive orders on federalism and
takings. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 26, 1987) (requiring that
executive agencies follow certain enumerated principles of federalism and consult states to
the extent practicable before pursuing policies that would limit state "policymaking
discretion"); Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 15, 1988), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (requiring executive agencies to conduct takings impact assessments
when making regulatory decisions that may impact private property rights).
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Perhaps public outrage can be seen as an especially dramatic exercise in
popular constitutionalism, not least when it is likely to have concrete
consequences. And when outrage is expressed by the political branches, they
may well be exercising their own independent interpretive authority, especially
when they ask for more severe constitutional barriers than the Court has proved
willing to erect. 176 If we emphasize the epistemic argument for judicial
attention to outrage, we might see that argument as embodying, even calling
for, a kind of popular constitutionalism, or at least attention to the independent
interpretive judgments of other branches.
I do not mean to speak directly here to the controversies over popular
constitutionalism and the distribution of interpretive authority among the
branches of government. Let us simply notice that when there is popular
"backlash," a great deal depends on its grounds, at least if the goal is to assess
the question whether it can be seen as an exercise in popular constitutionalism.
Perhaps the public's judgment is not in any sense rooted in a judgment about
constitutional meaning. Perhaps its outrage is a reflection of some kind of
policy-driven, constitution-blind opprobrium. If a cascade or group polarization
is at work, the epistemic argument loses much of its force; so too if there is a
systemic bias. On the other hand, "backlash" might legitimately be seen as
constitutionally relevant insofar as it reflects a widespread and considered
judgment about the merits of the constitutional issue. Here, as elsewhere, that
question cannot be resolved without an account of constitutional interpretation
and some information about what, exactly, lies beneath public outrage.
B. Elected Officials
My emphasis throughout has been on the resolution of legal issues, not
issues of policy. Might the consequential and epistemic concerns play a role in
the decisions of elected officials who are resolving policy issues? Suppose that
under the law, such officials have considerable room to maneuver. They are
certainly entitled to take a position on same-sex marriage, abortion, affirmative
action, and gun control; and within a certain range, they are permitted to act as
they see fit. How, if at all, do the consequentialist and epistemic concerns
matter to them? It is important to explore this question, because as we shall see,
the answer helps to illuminate some long-standing disputes about the
appropriate understanding of political representation.
As a matter of actual practice, public outrage is certainly relevant to the
decisions of many public officials, including presidents, legislators, governors,
and mayors. If they anticipate outrage in reaction to their decisions, they will
often be deterred, even if they think that the outrage is unjustified or worse. Of
course there is a large debate about whether representatives should make
176. For a recent example, see Kelo and the public reaction thereto, as explored in
Nadler et al., supra note 78.
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independent judgments or instead follow the views of those whom they
represent.177 Return in this light to cases IA-ID; suppose now that the
President of the United States holds the relevant views as a matter either of
constitutional interpretation or of fundamental principle. He might hesitate to
press those views for either of the two now-familiar reasons. He might believe
that if he acts in accordance with his convictions, he will produce bad
consequences. Alternatively, he might believe that his own judgments are
unreliable, simply because so many people disagree with him.
Suppose, for example, that an American president concludes that same-sex
marriages should be permitted; he believes that there is no good reason to ban
such marriages, and indeed he thinks that existing bans are a reflection of
unjustified prejudice and hostility. He might nonetheless hesitate before
pressing his view in public or through legislation. He might fear that such an
insistence would compromise the ultimate goal of producing same-sex
marriage. Perhaps an evolutionary process, involving a high degree of social
learning, is the best way of achieving his preferred end. Perhaps his own
approval would have a helpful influence on that process, but perhaps it would
compromise his other important goals, including those relating to national
security, energy independence, and income tax reform.
Whether or not a court should be concerned about its limited political
"capital," a national leader certainly has to decide whether and when to spend
that capital. If a president has an assortment of projects, he might well hesitate
before pressing a commitment that will generate public outrage. President
Clinton's early effort to allow gays and lesbians to serve in the military
produced a firestorm of protest, in a way that had serious adverse effects on his
first year in office. 178 Perhaps it would have been better, in light of President
Clinton's own goals, for him to have proceeded more slowly or not at all.
Consider here Abraham Lincoln's practices with respect to slavery.
Lincoln always insisted that slavery was wrong. 179 On the basic principle,
Lincoln allowed no compromises. No justification was available for chattel
slavery. But the fact that slavery was wrong did not mean that it had to be
eliminated immediately, or that African-Americans and whites had to be placed
immediately on a plane of legal equality. In Lincoln's view, the feeling of "the
great mass of white people" would not permit this result.1 80 In his most striking
formulation, Lincoln declared: "Whether this feeling accords with justice and
sound judgment, is not the sole question, if indeed, it is any part of it. A
177. See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
178. See JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY
POLICY (1999).
179. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 64-68; HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE
DIVIDED (1959).
180. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting I THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 256 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (speech at Peoria, Illinois, Oct. 16, 1854)).
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universal feeling, whether well or ill-founded, can not be safely
disregarded." 1
81
Evidently Lincoln believed that efforts to create immediate social change
in this especially sensitive area could have unintended consequences or
backfire, even if those efforts were founded on entirely sound principle. It was
necessary first to educate people about the reasons for the change. Passions had
to be cooled. Important interests had to be accommodated or persuaded to join
the cause. Issues of timing were crucial. For Lincoln, rigidity about the
principle was combined with caution about introducing the means by which the
just outcome would be achieved. As Bickel emphasized, the point is highly
relevant to constitutional law, especially in areas in which the Court is ruling in
a way that large numbers of people will reject.' 82 It is easy to imagine why
many elected officials might think in the same general terms suggested by
Lincoln.
Alternatively, the President might think that if most people do see a good
reason for some social practice, their views are entitled to respect. Indeed, an
elected official may well have stronger epistemic reasons to consider the views
of the public and the prospect of outrage than do judges, simply because the
views of the public are far more likely to bear on the particular questions that
concern the official. Suppose that an official believes that affirmative action
should be abolished tomorrow, or that abortion should be banned, but that a
strong majority of the public disagrees. The official might conclude that the
public has relevant information on questions of both fact and value, and that
she should hesitate before acting in a way that violates public convictions.
Here as well, however, the risks of systemic bias, cascade effects, and
polarization introduce important cautionary notes for politicians as well as for
judges. A conscientious leader will inquire into the relevant risks in deciding
whether to consider the possibility of outrage. The most general point is that an
understanding of the consequentialist and epistemic arguments helps to explain
debates over the concept of representation.' 83 Should politicians attempt to
implement the public will, or should they understand themselves as having
considerable discretion to depart from it? 184 Those who are skeptical about
official discretion, and want to cabin it, might have an epistemic point in mind.
Perhaps the public is likely, on some or many questions, to know a great deal
more than the relevant officials. Alternatively, they might believe, with
Lincoln, that in certain domains, the consequences would be very bad if
officials diverged too sharply from the public will. An appreciation of the
181. Id.
182. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 68-69.
183. See PITKrN, supra note 177.
184. The latter view is implicit in The Federalist No. 10, with its reference to
"refin[ing] and enlarg[ing]" the public view. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 47 (James Madison)
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 1989).
HeinOnline  -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 209 2007-2008
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
epistemic and consequentialist arguments should help to show when, and why,
the diverging models of representation have particular force.
C. Juries
Should juries attend to the risk of public outrage? We can imagine a variety
of possible cases: (a) A conviction of a defendant would produce significant
outrage. (b) An acquittal of a defendant would produce significant outrage. (c)
A civil verdict, imposing damages on a police department, would produce
significant outrage. (d) A civil verdict, refusing to impose damages on a police
department or a corporate polluter, would produce significant outrage. Does the
analysis of juries differ from the analysis of courts?
In one respect, the analysis is indeed different: The epistemic argument for
considering outrage seems weaker still. By its very nature, the jury will have
heard the relevant facts, and it will therefore have a significant comparative
advantage over the less informed public. It is hard to argue that on epistemic
grounds, the jury should attend to a widespread public judgment in favor of
either conviction or liability. In addition, the jury is supposed to be
representative of the public; and if it is indeed representative, it should be taken
as a more knowledgeable microcosm.
To be sure, the jury is not always a mere factfinder. It might bring its own
moral convictions to bear on the resolution of some factual questions, and
perhaps a widely held moral conviction on the part of the public as a whole,
signaled by the presence of outrage, has some epistemic value. But again, the
jury is supposed to be representative of the public, 185 and in general, its own
moral judgments should be a more informed version of those of the public as a
whole. It is hard to see circumstances in which jurors would do well, on
epistemic grounds, to consult the views of a public that has (by hypothesis)
failed to reflect on the details of the case.
186
In principle, the consequentialist argument is not so easily dismissed.
Suppose, for example, that a criminal conviction would produce very bad
consequences, such as riots that would ensure multiple deaths; or suppose that a
failure to convict would produce the same result. Suppose too that the jurors
have an accurate crystal ball, so that they know, for certain, about those very
bad consequences. At first glance, such consequences, if sufficiently bad, might
185. For evidence that the moral views of the jury are indeed likely to be
representative of the moral views of the public, see Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage
and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49
(1998).
186. Consider the discussion of the deliberative opinion poll in JAMEs S. FISHKrN, THE
VOICE OF THE PEOPLE (1995). Fishkin convincingly contends that the results of a deliberative
poll, conducted among informed citizens, are far more worthwhile than the results of a mere
opinion poll, conducted by asking people simply to state their views on questions on which
they have not reflected. A jury has an analogous advantage over the public generally.
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well justify a refusal to convict. The issue is hardest for criminal convictions;
the deontological objection to conviction of the innocent, in order to protect
other interests, is not easily rejected.187 Perhaps that objection can be
overridden if the heavens would fall, or even if the consequences would be
genuinely grave. And perhaps juries should consider consequences in civil
cases, or in cases in which consideration of outrage would result in a decision
not to convict someone who, in the jury's view, is genuinely guilty.
The simplest response to the consequentialist arguments would be based on
several points, all of them encountered in the judicial context as well. Jurors
lack crystal balls; juries might wrongly anticipate outrage and bad
consequences. Consequence-blind jury determinations are rarely likely to
produce especially bad consequences. Jury judgments might well be distorted
by considering consequences, in a way that would produce both unjust verdicts
and strategic behavior on the part of the public or segments of it (not good
consequences). It is reasonable to think that for rule-consequentialist and
systemic reasons, consequences are properly placed off-limits to the decisions
of juries. We can imagine a possible world, and a possible case, in which this
argument might be wrong. But in our world, and in our cases, it is almost
certainly correct.
CONCLUSION
If judges are consequentialists, and have perfect confidence in their
forecasts of consequences, they should be willing to consider the likely effects
of public outrage as part of their assessment of the consequences of one or
another course of action. On epistemic grounds, judges might conclude that a
widely and deeply held set of public convictions deserves respectful attention,
at least if judgments of fact or political morality are pertinent to the
constitutional question. The epistemic justification does not apply if a
systematic bias is likely to affect public judgments, if group polarization is at
work, or if most people are participating in some kind of informational, moral,
or legal cascade. I have suggested that on inspection, the epistemic justification
turns out to be quite fragile, but that in unusual cases, the consequentialist
arguments have considerable force-arguing, at the very least, in favor of
exercising the passive virtues or ruling in minimalist fashion.
The strongest arguments against judicial attention to the effects of outrage
are rule-consequentialist or based on considerations of system design. It is not
possible to rule out the possibility that the consequences will be best if judges
put the effects of outrage entirely to one side. The broadest point is that any
judgment in favor of Kantian adjudication, or for restricting the set of
considerations that judges may consider, must usually be defended in
consequentialist terms. If people in certain social roles, such as federal judges,
187. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 74.
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blind themselves to certain considerations, the reasons for doing so might
themselves be consequentialist.
The arguments for considering the effects of outrage are most forceful
when judges are deciding whether to invalidate legislation. In the case of
validations, there is far less reason to attend to outrage. It is true that if courts
had perfect tools by which to answer the underlying questions, some theories of
interpretation would suggest that the risk of outrage strengthens the argument
for invalidating statutes, at least if judges are otherwise in equipoise. But if the
public greatly objects to a law, it can respond by changing that law through
democratic means. To be sure, democratic change may be difficult to obtain;
and we have seen that widespread public outrage plays an occasional role in
assessing whether punishment is cruel and unusual and whether certain statutes
offend the Due Process Clause. But in the domain of validations, at least, there
are usually good rule-consequentialist reasons to disregard outrage altogether.
Those reasons are plausible but weaker in the case of invalidations.
I have emphasized that the strength of the argument for attending to
outrage might well depend on the governing theory of constitutional
interpretation. Originalists are not likely to accept the epistemic argument for
considering outrage. For those who adopt a moral reading of the Constitution
and who reject consequentialism, attending to outrage might seem jarring.
Principle is what matters, and the fact that the public would be outraged does
not seem to bear on what matters. But this conclusion is too quick, at least in
some imaginable cases. Most deontologists believe in consequentialist
overrides, and there is no reason to think that judicial judgments about the
requirements of morality are unerring. For broadly similar reasons, originalists
might pay attention to public outrage on consequentialist grounds, even though
the epistemic rationale seems weak. It follows that originalists, and those who
read the Constitution in moral terms, might be able to agree that when public
outrage is anticipated, it can be appropriate to exercise the passive virtues or to
proceed in minimalist fashion.
These points bear on the much-discussed question whether public
representatives should follow their own independent judgments or instead pay
close attention to what the public believes and wants. Even if a representative's
judgments diverge from those of the public, she might hesitate to insist on those
judgments if her insistence would disserve her most important projects, or if
she believes that the views of the public provide a signal that her own views are
wrong.
But my focus has been on the behavior of courts. In the general run of
cases, public outrage is indeed irrelevant; the rule-consequentialist objection is
convincing. In some circumstances, however, judges legitimately consider
public outrage because and to the extent that consequences matter, and because
and to the extent that outrage provides information about the proper
interpretation of the Constitution.
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